COMMENT
SEC DISCIPLINARY RULES AND THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: THE
REGULATION, ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

OF THE ATTORNEY
The need to maintain high standards of legal conduct and prevent
sharp practices by attorneys has long been recognized and fulfilled

through a variety of means and restraints.' In the securities and
public investment areas, lawyers have had a paramount role in ensur-

ing compliance with securities laws and "full disclosure" of information to investors.2 As a result, their professional and individual conduct has been subject to additional restraints imposed by the securi-

ties laws and the rules and informal controls of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).'

Although the SEC has regulated attorney conduct in one manner
or another since the Commission's inception, there have been several

indications in the last two years of an increasing effort on the part of
the SEC to augment the scope and intensity of this regulation.4 An
I. See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 22-55 (1953).
2. See Cohen, The Lawyer's Role in Securities Regulation, 24 Bus. LAW. 305 (1968);
Douglas, The Lawyer and the FederalSecurities Act, 3 DUKE BAR Ass'N J. (1935); Kennedy
& O'Donnell, Practiceof Law Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, 6 JOHN MARSHALL L.Q. 244 (1940); Throop, PracticeBefore the Securities and Exchange Commission, 4
J.D.C. BAR ASS'N 4 (Sept. 1937). See also note 241 infra.
3. Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice is a primary control. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)
(1972). See notes 58-201 infra and accompanying text. However, both state and federal securities laws directly and indirectly regulate and affect the practice of attorneys. See notes 33-36,
202-46 infra and accompanying text. See also Note, "BarChris" and the Securities Acts:
Practical Responses for Attorneys, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 360 (1969). Although the
SEC has a number of informal controls at its disposal-for example the timing, wording and
use of its releases-this Comment will not consider such controls.
4. The reasons for the SEC's attitude favoring increased regulation of attorney conduct are
unclear. The inaction or ineffectiveness of non-SEC controls over improper attorney conduct
may be one factor. See notes 14-57 infra and accompanying text. An increase in sharp practices
by attorneys in SEC matters may be another factor. But see note 61 infra. Additionally, the
increasing demands upon the limited resources of the SEC necessitate the implementation of
more efficient ways to protect the investing public. See note 244 infra. Increased regulation of
attorney conduct may have the effect of protecting investors since the attorney is in a position
to regulate and oversee securities practice. See note 241 infra and accompanying text.
An advisory committee of the SEC has also recognized this change in attitude:
A major development in the past several years has been the expansion of the Com-
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accelerated level of SEC control over attorney conduct has presented

itself in two major forms. First, the Commission has recently buttressed its personal arsenal of direct regulatory controls over attorney

conduct. It has accomplished this by promulgating comprehensive
and stringent amendments to its attorney disciplinary rules and by
increasing the frequency with which attorney disciplinary proceedings
are prosecuted.- Furthermore, the Commission has intensified its use
of the federal securities laws as a tool for restraining attorney misconduct. Specifically, the SEC is attempting to revitalize the specter of
civil liability of attorneys for securities laws violations.' In recent
litigation, for example, the SEC has sought to impose on attorneys
new, implied duties of disclosure owed to the SEC and the investing
public under the federal securities laws-duties which would expose
an attorney to a new threat of civil liability based on the attorney's
own securities malpractice or the active securities laws violations of
his client. 7 It is the thesis of this Comment that these recent developments are indicative of a new policy on the part of the SEC to impose

on the legal profession an unparalleled level of strict and aggressive
disciplinary regulation.
The increasing demands and responsibilities imposed upon attormission's oversight over the activities of lawyers . . . . In a number of court actions
and administrative proceedings the Commission has taken the position that these professionals in certain circumstances are accountable under the securities laws for actions
undertaken in their professional capacities. The position adopted by the Commission in
these cases has been controversial and is compelling a rethinking of traditional
professional-client relationships and obligations. The process of articulating appropriate
standards of conduct and reconciling fiduciary and public responsibilities, however, has
only begun. SEC, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES
AND PRACTICES 9 (June I, 1972).
Rule 2(e), under which the SEC can discipline attorneys, was originally promulgated in 1935
as Rule 11(k). I Fed. Reg. 1753 (1936).
5. For a discussion of the 1970 and 1971 amendments of Rule 2(e), see notes 51-57, 107110 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the frequency of SEC enforcement of
Rule 2(e), see notes 58-77 infra and accompanying text.
6. Wrongful securities conduct by an attorney has increasingly become a basis for civil relief
and liability. E.g., SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). See also notes 212-39 infra and
accompanying text. See generally Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-ChangingConcepts of
Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 43 (1968); Note, "BarChris" and the Securities Acts, supra note 3.
7. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb.
3, 1972). Such an extension of civil liability has caused an uproar among securities practitioners
in particular. See Green, Irate Attorneys: A Bid to Hold Lawyers Accountable to PublicStuns,
Angers Firms, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. I; Lawyers: The Confidence Game,
NEWSWEEK, March 6, 1972, at 60; S.E.C. Alleges Fraudin Stock Transaction, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 4, 1972, Business-Finance section, at 39, col. 6. See also notes 230-34 infra and accompanying text.
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neys by the SEC and the federal securities laws presumably are designed to promote the underlying policy of the securities
laws-protection of the investing public.' A more profound analysis
of the propriety of these augmented controls, however, must be predicated upon an examination of several additional factors. First, any
stepped-up regulation of attorney conduct can be justified only if it
is clear that additional protection to investors is in fact warranted.
Even if the additional protection is needed, a second question arises
as to whether the attorney is a proper subject upon which to impose
the extra regulation needed to obtain the additional investor protection. Finally, if the attorney is to bear the burden of providing the
extra protection, one must then determine the proper way to make
him fulfill this new role.
In attempting to answer the above questions and thereby examine
the propriety of any increased level of regulation of attorney conduct
by the SEC and the federal securities laws, this Comment will first
present a basic model for the regulation of attorney conduct. The
model will serve as an analytical tool in the discussion of the actual
role which the SEC and securities laws have in regulating attorney
conduct. Second, since increased pressure from the SEC presumably
will be appropriate only if alternative modes of disciplining attorney
conduct are failing or impotent, the utility and effectiveness of traditional non-SEC and non-securities laws controls will be considered.
Third, the mechanics and scope of the formal SEC disciplinary proceedings against attorneys will be reviewed. Finally, attorney duties
and responsibilities under the federal securities laws will be discussed
and evaluated.
A

BASIC MODEL FOR REGULATING ATTORNEY CONDUCT

In formulating a basic model of what the role of the SEC and
securities laws should be in regulating attorney conduct, a number of
fundamental principles must be accommodated. A threshold principle is that some aspects of a securities lawyer's conduct and practice
should be left untouched by the SEC and securities laws? Similarly,
due to its limited resources, the Commission by itself will not, as a
8. See Cohen, supra note 2. See generally Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the
Federal Securities Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L.
REv. 872 (1967); Knauss, supra note 6.
9. For example, certain practices of lawyers, such as advertising, are a more proper concern
for the bar association than the SEC.
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practical matter, be able to regulate all relevant attorney conduct)"0
Consequently, there will always be some reliance upon non-SEC and
non-securities laws controls to regulate attorney conduct.
Another basic principle which must be incorporated into any viable model for SEC attorney-conduct regulation dictates that, although there are various types of conduct which will be regulated by
the SEC and the federal securities laws, discriminations between the
different types of conduct must be made in determining the proper
controls to employ in the regulatory system. Therefore, any resulting
disciplinary system must be designed so that each sanction and procedure used is tailored to fit the particular type of attorney conduct
sought to be regulated. In determining whether the requisite harmony
between controls and classes of conduct is present in any given system
of SEC regulation of attorney conduct, at least four factors must be
considered and balanced.
A proper correlation between the degree of regulation and the
type of conduct regulated will depend, first, on the existence and
extent of any nexus between the lawyer's conduct and the SEC or
securities law practice. Attorney conduct directly before or related to
the SEC or securities practice, which can be classified as "core conduct," should be subject to the greatest scrutiny and regulation by the
SEC and the federal securities laws. The SEC justifiably has a strong
interest in controlling core conduct activities such as the preparation
and filing of registration statements, representation of witnesses or
respondents testifying in the course of SEC investigations or appearing in SEC proceedings, and the consultation with, and solicitation
of advice from, the SEC staff." In contrast to core conduct are
10. For a discussion of the Commission's limited financial and manpower resources and
the increasing new demands and problems facing the SEC, see note 244 infra. See generally
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 9. Because non-SEC enforcement is
financed by the private sector, it will reduce the cost of securities regulation to taxpayers, Id.
at 8; thus, there is a public policy justification for the Commission's reliance on non-SEC
controls. Lastly, the SEC is concerned with its inadequacy of resources, since it detracts from
the Commission's development of appropriate responses to emerging problems and impedes
long range planning. Id. at 10.
II. Throop, supra note 2, at 7-9.
Under its Rules of Practice, the SEC has given its own definition of practice:
Practice defined. For the purposes of this rule, practicing before the Commission
shall include, but shall not be limited to (1) transacting any business with the Commission; and (2) the preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by any attorney
.. . filed with the Commission in any registration statement, notification, application,
report or other document with the consent of such attorney. . . . 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g)
(1972).
See also note 36 infra.
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peripherally-related securities conduct and non-securities conduct,
2
both of which demand less SEC and securities law control.
Another factor which should affect the intensity of the regulation
employed in any attorney-conduct disciplinary system is the degree
of scienter or specific intent. Securities laws violations which are
intentionally committed, as compared to negligent violations, demand greater sanctions and restraint. 3 For example, a misrepresentation in a registration statement should be accorded harsher treatment when it results from a deliberate intent to mislead the investor
rather than mere careless preparation.
The propriety of the controls used in any scheme of SEC attorney-conduct regulation will also depend upon a balancing of two final
factors-the interests sought to be protected by the regulatory system, and the rights of the attorney being regulated. The greater the
risk of attorney misbehavior to the investing public, the more restraints which should be imposed upon attorney conduct. However,
where the attorney is more adversely affected and his rights are more
fundamental, the restraints upon him must become more circumscribed. Furthermore, in the event action taken against the lawyer is
wrongful or unfounded, remedial devices should be accorded to him.
The above principles and factors should be considered in discussing and evaluating any restraint or sanction imposed upon an attorney by the SEC or under the federal securities laws. Each case will
involve a balancing process, and the outcome will vary depending
upon the weight ascribed to each of the four factors. In this manner,
the investing public will be adequately protected, and the individual
attorney will receive fair treatment.
ADEQUACY OF

NON-SEC

CONTROLS IN REGULATING ATTORNEY
CONDUCT

The availability and effectiveness of non-SEC and non-securities
laws controls upon attorney conduct will invariably affect the fre12. The Commission has also recognized this distinction. See In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), on appeal, No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
reprintedin 29 AD. L.2D 361 (1971).
13. While the public interest often may require that a formal proceeding be com-

menced and that it be publicly announced, we recommend that the Commission give due
consideration in cases which appear to involve honest mistake or good faith efforts at
compliance to exercising its discretion against bringing a formal proceeding notwithstanding the appearance of a violation. ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra
note 4. at 30.
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quency and vigor with which the Commission will regulate attorney
conduct by means of the prosecution of its own disciplinary proceedings and the enforcement of the federal securities laws against attorneys. Where non-SEC controls are minimal and of no consequence,
there is greater pressure on the SEC to implement more controls of
its own, whether a particular act of securities misconduct is intentional or negligent. 14 Furthermore, to the extent that the controls are
ineffective, there will be greater reliance upon federal securities laws
to restrain wrongful attorney conduct. Similarly, to the extent that
the SEC has limited financial and human resources available, one
would expect greater pressure on the Commission to rely on and
incorporate other controls to regulate attorney conduct in the sphere
of public investment.
It seems clear, therefore, that one must analyze the viability of
the traditional non-SEC, non-securities laws controls in order to understand and evaluate the present role of the SEC and the federal
securities laws in regulating attorney conduct. Accordingly, the utility
of alternative controls such as local disciplinary proceedings, codes
of ethics, blue sky laws, and the sanctions of other federal agencies
will be examined in this Comment. To the extent that any non-SEC
controls are determined to be adequate or at least helpful to the SEC,
the efficacy of this alternate source of regulation will depend in turn
on whether the SEC can rely on these non-SEC controls to function
independently, or whether the Commission must expressly incorporate them into its own rules and regulations in order to derive any
benefits from their operation. 5
Local DisciplinaryProceedings

The most direct control upon attorney conduct is a local disciplinary proceeding, with its surrounding adverse publicity and threat of
disbarment." An action for disbarment may be based on any of a
number of offenses 7 and is generally initiated by the attorney's bar
14. The SEC has expressly recognized that this pressure exists. See 35 Fed. Reg. 15440

(1970).
15. For a discussion of the 1970 and 1971 amendments' incorporation of the SEC attorney
disciplinary rules, see notes 51-57, 107-10 infra and accompanying text.
16. For a general discussion of attorney disciplinary proceedings, see H. DRINKER, supra
note 1, at 33-35.
17. Offenses culminating in disbarment generally involve two distinct characteristics: (I)
the attorney is unfit to advise others; or (2) he is impugning the dignity of the court and the
reputation of the profession, and therefore is unworthy to continue in the legal profession. Id.
at 42-46.
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association or a local court."8 Despite their influence on attorney
behavior in general, local disciplinary proceedings for several reasons

are an inadequate means of controlling attorney misconduct for securities regulation purposes. First, there are deficiencies in enforcement. Many attorney offenses either go unreported, or if reported,

are never disciplined. 9 Second, the distance between the location
where the improper conduct occurs and the location of the disciplin-

ing body is often substantial and therefore creates serious barriers to
the initiation of local disciplinary proceedings."0 For example, a core
securities conduct offense may occur in Washington, D.C., whereas
the attorney's general law practice and the disciplinary body may be

located in his state of residence. Furthermore, assuming that the
geographical and other barriers can be overcome and local proceedings are brought, it is certain that there will be a long delay between
2
the occurrence of the violation and the disbarment of the attorney.

Yet, if the violator is a risk to the investing public, he remains a threat

to its safety during this interim period.
In addition to these often-cited inadequacies of local regulation,

an equally important drawback to local disciplinary proceedings is
that some offenses, although representing a substantial harm to the

investing public for securities regulation purposes, are not grounds
18. Id. at 35, 41-42.
19. Attorneys are not prone to report the violations of fellow practitioners. There is also
an inherent discretion in the bar association not to bring a proceeding against its own members.
See Note, Disbarment: A Case for Reform, 17 N.Y. L.F. 792, 800 (1971). For a general

criticism of attorney disciplinary proceedings, see Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar
Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. CIVIL RTs. L. REV. 301 (1970).

20. There is another similar problem of distance between the disciplining body and the
lawyer. Thus,
there is need for administrative regulations and enforcement of ethical standards. Because so many Washington lawyers are not members of the local bar, the only Grievance
Committee to which they are amenable is that of their own bar, which may be remote,
uninformed and even uninterested. C. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER 154 (1952).
21. See, e.g., In re Paul M. Kaufman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8925 (July
2, 1970). See notes 46-57 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the SEC's response
to the Kaufman problem. A subtle aspect of the "time delay" problem is the period of time
between an initial determination and the final decision after all appeals. Kaufman also involved
this drawback, but the SEC effectively curtailed this limitation in its 1970 amendments. See
note 56 infra.
22. The SEC has been particularly concerned with this problem:
The need for . . . revision . . . is apparent from a recent situation in which the

attorney, who had been convicted of violating certain provisions of the federal securities
laws, was able to file numerous documents with the Commission during the approximately II months between the conviction and his disqualification by the Commission.
35 Fed. Reg. 15440, 15441 (1970).
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for local disbarment. For example, it is possible for an attorney to
violate the federal or state securities laws without suffering disbarment.23 In this type of situation, there can be intense pressure on the
SEC to implement its own controls and sanctions.
Even if all of the obstacles and weaknesses could be overcome
and the local disciplinary proceedings were made to function efficiently, there would still remain an inherent drawback to the SEC's
reliance on local disciplinary proceedings as an adequate and
independent control of attorney conduct for securities regulation purposes. Absent an express incorporation of these controls into Rule
2(e)24 in a manner which would enable them to take effect automatically for SEC purposes, the burden of affirmative action would remain with the SEC to prevent the attorney from continuing his practice before the Commission. Until the recent promulgation of amendments to Rule 2(e), for example, even if an attorney was disciplined
locally he could still practice before the SEC until the Commission
initiated a Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceeding. 5 Consequently, there
would remain a continuing risk to the investing public during this
interim period. Furthermore, since the SEC might waive marginal
disciplinary cases to preserve its limited resources for more effective
utilization elsewhere," there is a possibility that the locally disciplined
attorney might never be restrained for securities regulation purposes.
The recent express incorporation into Rule 2(e) of the outcome of
local disciplinary proceedings might ameliorate some of these problems arising from the SEC's burden of affirmative action," but it may
not be a satisfactory solution in view of the many remaining disadvantages inherent in the alternate controls themselves.
ProfessionalCodes of Conduct
Codes of conduct, which have been in existence since 1887, remain
23. Eg., In re Richardson, 15 Cal. 2d 536, 102 P.2d 1076 (1940), order to show cause
discharged, 20 Cal. 2d 894, 123 P.2d 11 (1942) (federal securities law violations, but on the
face of record no moral turpitude shown); cf Schaeffer v. State Bar Ass'n, 26 Cal. 2d 739,
160 P.2d 825 (1945).
24. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e).
25. See, e.g., In re Paul M. Kaufman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8925 (July
2, 1970). But see note 107 infra where through express amendments to Rule 2(e) in 1970, the

burden of affirmative action was removed for particular offenses by providing for automatic
suspensions-that is, no SEC hearing is required.
26. See ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 10.
27. See notes 107-10 infra and accompanying text for instances where the SEC has done
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the primary guidelines by which an attorney may fashion his profes-

sional conduct.2 8 They were originally promulgated in order to standardize what was felt to be proper attorney conduct,29 but have been

severely criticized as inadequate for providing the proper guidance
and regulation for attorney conduct in general.30 Securities-related
conduct is not expressly treated by the codes of conduct, nor can
ethical standards be adequately relied on to control peripherally-

related and non-securities conduct in that the codes of conduct are
vague, ambiguous and amorphous-offering little help to the lawyer
in conducting himself within the confines of proper professional behavior." Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks, the SEC often relies

on canons of ethics in its attorney disciplinary proceedings as bench32
marks for proper legal conduct.
State Securities Laws

Blue sky laws are directed at the mechanics of securities transactions and do not expressly consider attorney conduct or enunciate
28. See, e.g., Code of Ethics, Alabama State Bar Association (1887), reprinted in H.
DRINKER, supra note I, at 352-66. See Note, Disbarment:A Casefor Reform, supra note 19,

at 795.
The canons of ethics of the various codes are considered to have no statutory force, but
they are regarded as standards of conduct. Thus, it was stated that
[c]odes of ethics adopted by bar associations, of course, have no statutory force. They
are indicative, however, of and reflect the attitude of the profession as a whole upon
those courses of action which they frown upon and interdict, and they are commonly
regarded by the bench and bar alike as wholesome standards of professional ethics.
Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723, 726 (D.D.C. 1952).
But ef E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 377 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (suggesting
that the codes have quasi-statutory force).
29. See Note, Disbarment. A Casefor Reform, supra note 19, at 795. The Code of Professional Responsibility succeeded the Canons of Ethics because substantive revision, treatment
of omitted areas of attorney conduct, practical improvement, and adaptation to changing legal
conditions were needed. ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY i (1969).
30. See Note, Disbarment:A Casefor Reform, supra note 19, at 795-97. See also Comment, supra note 19. One problem has been the failure of the legal profession to provide
standards for lawyers in their roles in the administrative process. L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 173 (1971). This failure may have the result that in the
administrative process, lawyers will adhere to ethical standards which are really more appropriate for judicial proceedings. Id. at 174. In the National Student Marketing case, this dilemma
is quite apparent. See notes 227-39 infra and accompanying text.
31. See Note, Disbarment: A Casefor Reform, supra note 19, at 796-97.
32. The SEC has used a number of ethical canons in disciplining a lawyer. E.g., In re
Murray M. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971) (Canons 34 and 35);
In re Irwin L. Germaise and Thomas F. Quinn, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5216 (Dec. 7,
1971) (Canon 6); In re Erwin Pincus and Pace Reich, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4619
(June 27, 1963).
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ethical guidelines for the legal profession. Consequently, the state
securities laws are not designed to control the peripherally-related
securities conduct and the non-securities conduct of the practicing
attorney. These blue sky laws, however, do serve as a non-SEC control upon core securities conduct, since a violation may be grounds
for initiating a local disciplinary proceeding. 3
The adequacy of state securities laws as a restraint even on improper core securities conduct is, for SEC purposes, limited. First,
since the use of blue sky laws as a control on attorney conduct depends on the adequacy of local disciplinary proceedings, any effective
reliance on state securities laws to regulate attorneys for SEC purposes will be limited by the problems which are inherent in local
disciplinary proceedings.34 Furthermore, unless the violation of a
state security law is considered a felony or a crime of moral turpitude,
the lawyer will not necessarily be disbarred.35 Since this is not always
the case, the state securities laws cannot always be relied on to trigger SEC attorney disciplinary controls. Finally, even if the lawyer is
disciplined for a blue sky law violation, he may still become involved
in core or peripherally-related securities conduct." Thus, the attorney may remain a continuing risk to the investing public until the
SEC bars him from activities related to federal securities practice.
FederalAdministrative Agencies

Under the present system each separate federal agency must be
relied upon to restrain improper attorney conduct relating to the
practice of law before that particular agency. Although most agencies
have provided for disciplinary measures over attorneys appearing
before them, 37 the disciplinary proceedings of other agencies have
33. The general rule is that the violation of a state or federal securities law constitutes a

ground for local disciplinary action against an attorney. See, e.g., In re Langford, 64 Cal. 2d
489, 413 P.2d 437, 50 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1966); In re Greenhill, 21 App. Div. 2d 79, 248 N.Y.S.2d
452 (1964). Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Shott, 10 Ohio St. 2d 117, 226 N.E.2d 724 (1967); State v.
Kelly, 39 Wis. 2d 171, 158 N.W.2d 554 (1968); State v. Rogers, 226 Wis. 39, 275 N.W. 910
(1937). See also Attorneys-Discipline-Securities, 18 A.L.R.3d 1408 (1968).
34. See notes 16-32 supra and accompanying text.
35. E.g., In re Richardson, 15 Cal. 2d 536, 102 P.2d 1076 (1940), affd iner., 20 Cal. 2d
894, 123 P.2d 11 (1940).
36. If the attorney is disbarred, he can no longer practice law. However, since securities
practice is not limited to the practice of law, the attorney who is disbarred may still "practice"
before the SEC. See note I I supra. For a discussion of the broad scope of "securities practice,"
see note 148 infra.
37. Commodity Exchange Authority, 17 C.F.R. §§ 0.11(c)(1), .61(c)(1) (1972); Federal
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limited utility for SEC purposes. The ability of the SEC to rely on
the disciplinary measures of other agencies to restrain improper

securities-related conduct is limited inherently to situations in which
the attorney is practicing before both the SEC and the other
agency. 8 Moreover, since there is no formal inter-agency reciprocity

of sanctions, disciplinary action over an attorney by another agency
will not necessarily prevent the attorney from appearing before the

SEC. 9 Consequently, as is the case with most non-SEC, attorneyconduct regulatory controls, the burden remains with the Commission to take affirmative action to restrain the attorney for securities
law purposes.
A "federal administrative bar," which would control the practice

and conduct of attorneys appearing and practicing before all federal
agencies, might serve as a viable non-SEC control over improper
attorney conduct." Although the need for such a regulatory body has
been pointed out 4 and legislation proposing such a body has been

Communications Commission, 47 C.F.R. § 1.24(a) (1972); Federal Power Commission, 18
C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(1) (1972), Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. § 4.1(d)(2) (1972); Immigration and Naturalization Service, 8 C.F.R. § 292.3 (1972); Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.50 (1972); Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 C.F.R. § 1100.13 (1972); Patent Office,
37 C.F.R. § 1.348 (1972). See also Cheatham, The Reach of FederalAction Over the Profession of Law, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1288 (1966); Henley, Admission To and Control of Practice
Before FederalAdministrative Agencies, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 400 (1958); Robinson, Lawyers and
Practitioners:A Study in Contrasts, 21 A.B.A.J. 277 (1935); Waterman, FederalAdministrative Bars: Admission and Disbarment, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 261 (1936); Note, Admission to
PracticeBefore and Disbarment From FederalAdministrativeAgencies, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV.
477 (1961).
38. See note 37 supra for examples of other agencies which discipline attorneys. However,
even in this instance there is another drawback, since administrative disciplinary proceedings
are rarely initiated. See Henley, supra note 37, at 401.
39. Rule 2(e), as originally promulgated, did not provide for interagency reciprocity of
attorney disbarments or suspensions. The 1970 amendments, in adding subsection 2, did provide for automatic suspension from SEC practice where an attorney had been disbarred by a
court, but made no express provision for such reciprocity in the event of a disbarment by
another federal agency. Rule 2(e)(2) does mention "convicting agency," but only for the purpose of determining when a non-SEC disbarment "shall be deemed to have occurred." 17
C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(2). However, and more importantly, Rule 2(e)(2) does not use the word
"agency" in stating the general rule for imposing the automatic suspension from SEC practice.
Id.
40. See generally Robinson, supra note 37; Waterman, supra note 37.
41. A federal administrative agency "practitioners bar" was proposed at a very early date.
The time is perhaps approaching for a general coordination of the functions, rules,
and practices of these [federal] agencies. ...
By this proposal a uniform method of rules of practice and procedure would exist
before all the various departments of the administrative tribunal. In addition, it would
no doubt mean the beginning of a new practitioners bar. Robinson, supra note 37, at
280 (footnote omitted).
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introduced,42 a federal practitioners' bar has not yet been established.
In addition to a federal administrative bar, a number of other similar
alternatives-including a separate federal agency overseeing federal
practitioners and a uniform code of federal administrative practice-have been suggested and rejected.4 3 Consequently, the general
rule remains that each agency controls the practice of attorneys who
appear before it.44 However, in the event that uniformity of federal
administrative practice is achieved, it is not clear whether any of the
various suggested alternatives would be desirable from a securities
5
law point of view.1
Need for Affirmative SEC Controls
Although non-SEC controls are available to guide and regulate
attorney conduct, their effectiveness for SEC and securities laws purposes has not been satisfactory. To the extent that harmful and unethical practices are not reported, not covered, or not disciplined, there
is great pressure on the SEC to implement a regulatory system of its
own in order to achieve maximum protection for the investing public.
As will be discussed more fully in subsequent sections of this Comment, the SEC has responded, at least partially, by means of its Rules
of Practice and recent amendments thereto.
The general ineffectiveness of alternative regulatory systems for
SEC purposes is illustrated by a recent disciplinary proceeding, In re
Paul M. Kaufman.46 In the Kaufman proceeding, the SEC was confronted with a situation in which a lawyer had been convicted of
willfully violating a federal securities law but had not yet been disbarred from the practice of law by any local disciplinary body."7
See also Waterman, supra note 37.
42. See, e.g., S. 932, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1958). See also HOOVER COMMISSION, TASK
FORCE REPORT (1955).
43. See. e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2657 Before Subcomm. on PracticeBefore Gov't Agencies
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,80th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1948). See also S. 318 & S.
1466, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); S. 17, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953).
44. See note 37 supra. However, each agency does not control the admission of attorneys
to its practice. See note 95 infra and accompanying text. But see note 96.
45. For example, a drawback to a uniform code of federal administrative practice and a
separate agency overseeing federal practitioners is that the special needs of the SEC in controlling certain practices may be sacrificed by treating all agencies uniformly, Furthermore, the
SEC, by regulating harmful attorney conduct itself, can better integrate the sanctions for the
attorney vis-a-vis the federal securities laws.
46. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8925 (July 2, 1970).
47. Id. at 2 n.3. See also 35 Fed. Reg. 15440, 15441 (1970), the text of which appears in
note 22 supra.
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During the interim period between conviction and possible disbarment, the attorney practiced before the Commission.and continued
to handle securities work. Although the SEC had no express power
under its disciplinary Rule 2(e) to disbar an attorney from SEC
practice for violation of a federal securities law4 8 the Commission did
have authority under that rule to deny the right to practice before the
SEC to any attorney whom the Commission found, after a hearing,
"not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others," to be
lacking in character or integrity, or "to have engaged in unethical or
improper professional conduct."4 Consequently, the SEC, using its
broad powers under Rule 2(e), brought its own disbarment proceedings and finally suspended Kaufman from further securities practice
on the basic ground that he was "unqualified" to practice before the
SEC." Although the local disciplinary control had failed altogether
for SEC purposes in Kaufman, the SEC took affirmative action and
found the necessary flexibility and protection within its own disciplinary rule in order to remove the wrongdoer from securities practice.
In 1970, immediately after Kaufman, the SEC expressly amended
Rule 2(e) to remedy some of the problems associated with the Commission's burden of taking affirmative action in order to discipline
an attorney who had violated provisions of the federal securities laws
or certain other types of statutes.5 1 After the 1970 amendments, the
willful violation of a securities law became a specific ground for
initiating a Rule 2(e) disqualification hearing.52 More importantly,
the Commission is now, on the basis of other 1970 amendments to
Rule 2(e), empowered to suspend automatically from SEC practice,
without any burden of affirmative action on its part, any attorney
who has been suspended or disbarred by local proceedings or convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. 3 The
1971 amendments to Rule 2(e) reduce the SEC's burden of affirmative action even further by providing for automatic temporary suspension from SEC practice where a lawyer has been convicted of a
48. See 17 C.F.R. .§ 201.2(e)(l)(i), (ii) (1972), which was the original disciplinary rule. See
also In re Paul M. Kaufman, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8925, at 2-3 (July 2,
1970). Cf.35 Fed. Reg. 15440 (1970), where the SEC stated that in view of Kaufman, a
clarification of Rule 2(e) was needed.
49. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.2(e)(l)(i), (ii) (1972).
50. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8925, at 4 (July 2, 1970).
51. See generally 35 Fed. Reg. 15440 (1970).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(I)(iii) (1972).
53. Id. § 201.2(e)(2). The text of this amendment is provided in note 107 infra.
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federal securities law violation, enjoined from further violating the
federal securities laws, or has consented to such an injunction.54
As will be more fully developed in the remainder of this Comment, the Commission's solution to the deficiencies of non-SEC controls, therefore, has been threefold. First, due to its limited resources,
the SEC continues to rely on these alternative controls. However, the
Commission has found that it can do this effectively only by incorporating the other controls expressly into the mechanics of Rule 2(e).11
Second, the SEC has removed any possible time lags by providing
that the suspensions from SEC practice based on the consummation
of these alternative controls, where applicable, will be automatic.1t
No longer will the SEC's burden of affirmative action cause delays
between the consummation of the local controls and the effectuation
of the SEC disciplinary measures. Finally, the Commission has
shown that it will use and restructure Rule 2(e) where necessary to
meet the inadequacies of non-securities controls."
SEC

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

The SEC has only one formal method by which it directly controls
attorney conduct-Rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice. 8 Rule 2(e), as
originally and presently worded, applies to the core, peripherallyrelated, and non-securities conduct of practicing attorneys. The
SEC apparently can impose sanctions for either intentional or negligent offenses. The SEC has consistently attempted to apply the rule,
and when necessary restructure it, in order to provide a sufficient
amount of protection to the investing public, while at the same time
affording some degree of fairness to the attorney. 9
HistoricalDevelopment of Rule 2(e)
The development of Rule 2(e) may be divided conveniently into
three overlapping stages. During the early period of its history, from
1935 to 1960, the Rule remained as originally promulgated, was
54. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(i).
55. See id. § 201.2(e)(2). See also 35 Fed. Reg. 15440, 15441 (1970).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(2). The text of this amendment appears in note 107 infra. This
provision is quite drastic in that a decision, with an appeal pending, is considered final for Rule
2(e)(2) purposes.
57. See 35 Fed. Reg. 15440 (1970).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1972).
59. See 35 Fed. Reg. 15440 (1970); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5147 (May 10, 1971).
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seldom used by the SEC, and was never judicially construed. 0 The

second period, the 1960's, was characterized by increased implementation of the rule and an awareness by the SEC of a number of
deficiencies inherent in Rule 2(e) as originally drafted. The third
period, the 1970's, has been characterized by major structural and

substantive revisions to the Rule, and at present, judicial definition
and development of Rule 2(e) is occurring.
Priorto 1960. There are no SEC attorney disciplinary proceed-

ings appearing on record prior to 1950.61 This initial dormancy of
Rule 2(e) was probably due to the Commission's philosophy of "self-

regulation" with respect to the functioning of the legal profession.6 2
Apparently, the SEC waited for any control, change and reform of

the legal profession to come from within.63
During the 1950's, a total of four disciplinary actions were
brought. 4 Each proceeding was directed at intentional and flagrant
violations of core securities conduct-violations generally arising
from a failure to disclose material information to the SEC and the

investing public.65 Peripherally-related and non-securities conduct
60. The Rule was slightly altered to eliminate certain problems in admission requirements.
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 1761 (June 27, 1938). In 1957, an attorney sought to enjoin
a 2(e) proceeding. However, this attempt at a preliminary injunction failed, and the Rule itself
was not considered. Although the district court spoke of the SEC power to promulgate Rule
2(e), the appellate court held that the lower court was in error in considering the SEC's power
to discipline an attorney. Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701 (D.D.C. 1947), aff d on other
grounds, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958). For a discussion of
Schwebel, see note 170 infra.
61. It is possible that attorney disciplinary actions are not publicly disclosed. This was true
before the Rule's recent amendments, e.g., In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5163, at I (June 29, 1971) and was expressly made possible in 1971:
All hearings held under this paragraph [Rule 2(e)] shall be non-public unless the
Commission on its own motion or the request of a party otherwise directs. 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(e)(7) (1972).
Thus, it should be noted that the SEC may be merely disclosing more attorney disciplinary
proceedings rather than initiating a greater number of them.
62. For a discussion of the SEC's self-regulation philosophy, see Jennings, Self-Regulation
in the Securities Industry: The Role of the SEC, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 663 (1964). See
also ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 57-61.
63. Cf. ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 9. Reform of attorney
conduct from within was originally considered a prerequisite to SEC success in regulating
public investment. See note 241 infra.
64. In re Sol M. Alpher, 39 S.E.C. 346 (1959); In re James T. DeWitt, 38 S.E.C. 879
(1959); In re William A. Dougherty, 38 S.E.C. 82 (1957); In re Albert J. Fleischmann, 37
S.E.C. 832 (1950).
65. For a detailed factual summary of these four disciplinary proceedings, see Kemp,
DisciplinaryProceedingsby the S.E.C. Against Attorneys, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 23, 27-32
(1965). For shorter summaries, see Goldberg, PracticingBefore the SEC: Commission's Rule
of Practice-Rule2(e), N.Y.L.J., April 14, 1972, at 1, cols. 1-2, at 5, cols. 1-3.
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were not expressly disciplined during this period.
1960's. During the 1960's, the SEC used Rule 2(e) extensively,

initiating a total of eleven disciplinary proceedings.66 All of these
involved an intentional failure to disclose material information on the

part of the disciplined attorney.67 However, several of the SEC decisions indicated, in dictum, that negligent offenses would also constitute a Rule 2(e) violation.6" Furthermore, the SEC in several proceed-

ings imposed its own sanctions in addition to those levied against the
attorney by some other disciplinary authority." This transitional pe-

riod of the 1960's can best be characterized as revealing (1) an uneasiness and concern on the SEC's part for unethical and improper attor-

ney conduct which adversely affects the investing public, and (2) an
SEC willingness to use its own resources to prevent such practices.
1970's. During the most recent period in Rule 2(e)'s history,
SEC disciplinary proceedings are being employed with more frequency than ever before. Within the last two years, a total of six

disciplinary proceedings have been brought.70 As in the past, most
66. In re Irving S. Reamer, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4864 (May 1, 1967); In re
Marshall I. Stewart, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4829 (April 29, 1966); In re Leonard
Maizlish, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4739 (Dec. 1, 1964); In re Donald Keltner, SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4738 (Nov. 30, 1964); In re John D. Glynn, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4734 (Nov. 27, 1964); In re Ronald H. Freedmond, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 4736 (Nov. 24, 1964); In re Leonard A. Nikoloric, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4642
(Sept. 19, 1963); In re Erwin Pincus and Pace Reisch, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4619
(June 27, 1962); In re Nathan Wechsler, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6932 (Nov.
5, 1962); In re Arnold D. Naidich, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4372 (June 8, 1961); In re
Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960), modified, 40 S.E.C. 459 (1961).
67. For a detailed factual summary of the attorney disciplinary proceedings brought during
the 1960-63 period, see Kemp, supra note 65, at 32-40. For shorter summaries, see Goldberg,
supra note 65, at 5, cols. 2-3.
68. Whether or not respondent intended to facilitate evasions of the law, his conduct
evidenced at least a gross indifference to the observance of legal requirements which an
attorney in particular should strive to foster . . . . In re Morris Mac Schwebel, 40
S.E.C. 347, 371 (1960), modified, 40 S.E.C. 459 (1961).
See also In re Leonard Maizlish, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4739 (Dec. 1, 1964) (a filing
done by the lawyer contained material misrepresentations and omissions which he reasonably
should have known were false and misleading).
69. E.g., In re Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960), modified, 40 S.E.C. 459 (1961);
In re Irwin L. Germaise and Thomas F. Quinn, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5216 (Dec. 7,
1971).
70. In re Elliot S. Blair, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9666 (July 14, 1972);
In re Ivan Allen Ezrine, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5268 (July 7, 1972); In re Thomas
R. Blonquist, SEC Litigation Release 5397 (May 25, 1972); In re Irwin L. Germaise and
Thomas F. Quinn, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5216 (Dec. 7, 1971); In re Murray A.
Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), on appeal, No. 71-1602 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); In re Paul M. Kaufman, SEC Securities Act Release No. 8925 (July 2, 1970).
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offenses which have been prosecuted involved core securities conduct
and were intentional and flagrant violations of the securities laws.7

However, for the first time in Rule 2(e) history, the SEC in two
disciplinary proceedings has redressed peripheral securities misconduct as well.72 Because of its increased use of Rule 2(e) in recent years,
the SEC is beginning to establish a "common law" of SEC discipli-

nary decisions, a development which will provide more meaning to
Rule 2(e).
In addition to the increased frequency of SEC disciplinary proceedings, the 1970's have already been marked by two major developments in the substantive evolution of Rule 2(e). First, as previously
discussed, the SEC has responded to some of the inherent deficiencies
in the original Rule 2(e) and amended the rule twice in order to ensure
a more efficient SEC use of non-SEC disciplinary controls and in
general provide a more active SEC response to improper attorney

conduct. 73 To some extent, the SEC has achieved this result at the
expense of the procedural safeguards of an attorney's constitutional

rights.7 1 Yet, despite all the amendments, there still are a number of
7
additional changes to Rule 2(e) which should be made.

1

A second major development in the substantive evolution of Rule
2(e) during the 1970's is the judicial review which is being afforded

the Rule for the first time. In SEC v. Ezrine,76 for example, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York gave major
consideration to the scope of Rule 2(e) and provided additional judi-

7
cial enforcement to an SEC sanction. Furthermore, in Kivitz v. SEC
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has the
opportunity to examine and clarify several aspects of a Rule 2(e)

proceeding.
71. For a brief factual summary of each disciplinary proceeding, see Goldberg, supra note
65, at 5, col. 3.
72. In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971) (improper use of layman as an intermediary); In re Irwin L. Germaise and Thomas F. Quinn, SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5216 (Dec. 7, 1971) (non-disclosure to client of a secret partnership).
73. See notes 46-57 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 107-10 infra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 82-88 infra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 194-96 infra and accompanying text.
76. F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1972), reported in 164 BNA SEc. REG. & L. Rae. A12 (1972). Ezrine had been involved in a civil securities action. See SEC v, Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). See notes
145-49 infra and accompanying text.
77. D.C. Cir. No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Oral argument was held on Oct. 27, 1972. For
a discussion of the Kivitz case, see notes 179-91 infra and accompanying text.
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Nature of a Rule 2(e) Proceeding
The Rule 2(e) proceeding, like other agency proceedings, is quasi-

judicial.7" As a consequence, certain inherent powers, such as the
contempt and subpoena authority, are available to the SEC.79 However, because the ultimate sanction of a Rule 2(e) proceeding is exclu-

sion from securities practice rather than total disbarment from the
practice of law,"' it is not clear what procedural protections are guar-

anteed to an attorney by either the Federal Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).8 '
Disciplinary actions brought by a federal agency are ostensibly
subject to constitutional safeguards.82 However, the scope of constitutional protection afforded the disciplined attorney in a Rule 2(e)
proceeding may be somewhat limited, since
the end result

. . .

is not disbarment in the sense in which that term is

generally understood-but an order excluding him from appearing as counsel
before the Commission. The distinction is one in kind and not degree.8

Because of this distinction in the nature of the sanction imposed, a

disciplined attorney would receive less constitutional protection in a
Rule 2(e) proceeding than in a disbarment proceeding by a local bar

association.

4

A reduction of an attorney's procedural safeguards

might also be justified on the basis that the ability to practice or
78. E.g., Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1952); Camp v. Herzog, 104 F.
Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952), af'd, 190 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
79. Id. In addition, a quasi-judicial body is considered to have inherent power to discipline
under its rule-making authority. See notes 91-98 infra and accompanying text,
80. In essence, the argument is that the attorney is only deprived of his securities practice,
and therefore still has other areas of professional opportunity available, However, such reasoning must be rejected, since
[t]he economic consequences of an attorney . . . being unable to practice before the
commission can be significant. In addition to being precluded from appearing in administrative actions, disqualified individuals would be foreclosed from being named as experts in registration statements and in annual reports. Goldberg, supra note 65, at 1,
cols. 1-2.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. (1970).
82. Cf Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1956).
83. Herman v.Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 723, 726 (D.D.C. 1952). Herman involved a disciplinary action against an attorney by the International Claims Commission. However, its rationale is clearly applicable to an SEC proceeding.
84. See In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971),
where the attorney was given a harsher sanction "on account of the fact that a suspension from
practice before this Commission would not be as serious as a court-ordered suspension which
would completely bar the attorney from engaging in any form of law practice during the period
of suspension."
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appear before the SEC is a mere privilege,"5 rather than a right, and
consequently there are no constitutional safeguards attached to it.
However, this argument appears to be unsound, and the Commission
8
has not relied on it.

The failure of the SEC to grant the SEC-disciplined attorney a
full constitutional arsenal of procedural safeguards is best illustrated

by the relatively low burden of proof which the SEC must sustain in
order to discipline an attorney successfully in a Rule 2(e) proceeding.
If the maximum level of constitutional protection were extended to

the attorney, then the SEC presumably would be required to establish
a Rule 2(e) violation by "clear and convincing" proof.87 However, the

SEC has recently determined that the Commission in a Rule 2(e)
proceeding need only prove its case by a "preponderance of the evi-

dence." 8 Accordingly, the SEC has denied the attorney maximum
constitutional protection with reference to the requisite burden of

proof in SEC disciplinary proceedings, and this result, if adopted by
the judiciary, might serve as a basis for justifying the erosion of other
procedural rights in Rule 2(e) cases.

Contrary to the general uncertainty over the applicability of constitutional procedural safeguards in a Rule 2(e) proceeding, the de-

gree of protection afforded an SEC-disciplined attorney under the
APA is more certain. Although initial decisions in analogous discipli85. Rule 2(e) expressly states that practice before the SEC is a "privilege." 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(e) (1972). The Commission has also stated: "[t]he right to appear and practice before
this Commission as an attorney is, like membership in the bar itself, a privilege burdened with
conditions." In re Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347, 371 (1960). A former Commissioner
has indicated that the privilege to appear before the SEC imposes duties on the lawyer to assist
in achieving the protection of the investing public. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 306.
86. Although the commission refers to the "privilege" of practicing or appearing
before it, the Commission is aware that the "right" versus "privilege" dichotomy has
long been challenged. Goldberg, supra note 65, at 1,col. 2.
See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968), for a discussion of the problems in relying on the
"privilege" argument when the federal government or agency thereof denies constitutional
protection.
87. Cf.In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361, 370 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1951);
In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 361 (E.D. Va. 1967). But cf.Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715,
717 (1963).
The Supreme Court has not ruled on which standard of proof is required; however, it has
characterized disbarment actions as "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature." In re
Buffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). Under this view, the Court may require the higher standard
of clear and convincing evidence for attorney disciplinary proceedings, including those initiated
by federal agencies such as the SEC.
88. In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1972:969

nary proceedings indicated that the APA was not applicable to Rule

2(e) proceedings, 9 more recent decisions and the SEC itself have
taken the position that the APA safeguards do apply.'"
SEC Power to Discipline Attorneys
The SEC has been given no express statutory authority to regulate

or discipline attorney conduct, nor has the SEC imposed any prescribed limits in exercising any implied power. Consequently, Rule
2(e) proceedings are often challenged on the basis that the Commission either is without power to discipline an attorney or has transgressed the limits of that power in a given case.9
Despite the lack of express statutory authority to regulate attorney conduct, both the courts and the SEC have recognized that the

Commission has implied power to discipline an attorney.92 The source
of this authority is the SEC's rule-making power under the securities

laws.1 3 Perhaps the only limitation on the exercise of this rule89. E.g., Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
90. E.g., Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 704-06 (D.D.C. 1957), affd on other
grounds, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958).
91. E.g., In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971);
Initial Decision In re Paul M. Kaufman, SEC Administrative Proceedings, File No. 3-2113
(Dec. 19, 1969) (W. Blair, Hearing Examiner).
92. Rule 2(e) has been promulgated and amended pursuant to section 23(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970), which provides in pertinent part that the
Commission shall have "power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for
the execution of the functions invested in [it] . . . by this title." See also 36 Fed. Reg, 8933
(1971); 35 Fed. Reg. 15440 (1970), both of which cite section 23(a) as the source of attorney
disciplinary power. Other implied statutory sources of SEC disciplinary power are 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77s, 77sss, 79t, 80a-37, 80b-I 1 (1970).
In dicta, the district court in connection with a Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceeding in Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 704 (D.D.C. 1957), affdon othergrounds, 251 F.2d 919 (1958),
expressly upheld the authority of the SEC to promulgate Rule 2(e) under its general rule
making authority. However, the court of appeals held that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedy and stated that the lower court erred in reaching the question of SEC authority
to disbar. Nevertheless, the lower court's position on attorney-disciplinary authority is viewed
as sound. See Kemp, supra note 65, at 26. See also note 170 infra. This implied source of
attorney-disciplining power has been upheld in analogous agency disciplinary proceedings. See
Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Herman v. Dulles,
205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Under these decisions no specific authority to discipline was
necessary, since such power is inherent in a quasi-judicial body's rule-making authority.
93. This requirement was imposed in an analogous NLRB attorney disciplinary proceeding.
Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952), affd, 190 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The
court in Camp stated that
[tihe rule making power is a very different thing from the adjudicatory process. It is
one thing for the Congress to say that an administrative agency shall have the right to
prescribe by rule for the admission and disciplinary measures of attorneys practicing
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making authority as an implied source of disciplinary power is that
the SEC must promulgate the necessary attorney disciplinary rules
before bringing any disciplinary action, a requirement with which the
SEC has long complied. 4
More recently, recognition of implied SEC power to discipline
attorneys under its rulemaking authority has come from the Administrative Practice Act (APrA). 5 Although Congress, by means of the
APrA, has expressly pre-empted the power of each federal agency to
regulate independently the admission of attorneys to that agency's
practice, the APrA does not authorize or deny the power of an
agency to discipline the attorney once he is admitted. Thus, under the
wording of the APrA, it is arguable that Congress has not denied that
each agency has implied disciplinary power derived from other statutory sources." Although there are some problems with the validity of
this argument, it is supported by much authority. 8
before it, and quite another to say that Congress intended such an agency to adjudicate
and enforce disciplinary action without any statutory provision or rule promulgated in
pursuance of statutory authority. The force of this difference is readily apparent when
viewed in the confusing and conflicting situations that beset the whole subject of admission to and control over practice before administrative agencies. Id. at 138.
94. See I Fed. Reg. 1753 (1935), which promulgated Rule 2(e) originally as Rule II(k).
95. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1970) provides in pertinent part that
(d) This section does not
(2) authorize or limit the discipline, including disbarment, of individuals who
appear in a representative capacity before an agency ...
The Act basically eliminated agency-established admission requirements and bars for attorneys practicing before federal agencies. See generally Sagar & Shapiro, Administrative Practice Before Federal Agencies, 4 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 76 (1969).
96. It should be pointed out that the SEC has provided in its own regulations for the
admission of attorneys in Rule 2(b). See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(b) (1972). The Commission is of
the opinion that the APrA "only makes automatically eligible a certain class of attorneys, i.e.
those admitted to the highest court of a State. It does not preclude an agency's admission to
practice before it of other individuals bearing other credentials or qualifications." Initial Decision, In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Administrative Proceeding at 5, File No. 3-1972 (April 17,
1970) (D. Markun, Hearing Examiner). Consequently, under this view, although the APrA has
set nininum standards for admission to federal agency practice, the Act does not preempt the
power of agencies to set lower admission requirements.
97. There are several matters regarding agency practice before federal administrative agencies which are not covered by the Administrative Practice Act . . . . More
importantly, the Act specifically does not authorize or limit discipline, including disbarment, of persons appearing before any agency. Consequently, agencies maintain authority to deal with these matters, and regulations in regard thereto are in effect. Sagar &
Shapiro, supra note 95, at 88.
98. The legislative history of the APrA suggests that the Act was intended not to affect
the power of agencies to discipline attorneys but only the various formal admissions procedures.
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Assuming the SEC has the general power to discipline attorneys,

it then becomes necessary to examine the scope of that disciplinary
authority in terms of the types of wrongful attorney conduct which
are cognizable by the Commission under Rule 2(e). Although the
SEC has provided a general rule for the scope of its Rules of Practice,99 the definition found therein is totally unworkable for purposes
of determining the scope of Rule 2(e). One would expect that
peripherally-related securities conduct and non-securities conduct

would not be cognizable by the SEC due to the attenuated relationship between these types of conduct and the proper interests of the

SEC. Nevertheless, the SEC has stated that conduct which is unrelated to the securities practice is still within Rule 2(e)'s ambit100 The
See H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Furthermore, in introducing the bill
leading to the enactment of the APrA, Congressman Willis stated: "It does not affect the power
of agencies to discipline persons who appear before them." 11I CONG. REc. 27193 (1965).
Disciplinary procedures require a case by case determination of misconduct and not reliance
upon uniform criteria of qualification. For a discussion of these arguments, see Brief for
Appellee at 37-46, Kivitz v. SEC, Civil Action No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Sagar
and Shapiro, supra note 95, at 88.
The problems in this implied recognition argument arise because for several reasons it can
also be argued that the APrA has precluded the power of any federal agency to discipline an
attorney unless such power has been expressly given to the agency. First, since the APrA states
that it "does not authorize or limit the discipline, or disbarment," it can be contended that
Congress, by prohibiting any construction by which the APrA itself can become an implied
source of power, is in effect requiring express grants of attorney disciplinary power to the
agencies. Therefore, even if agencies did have implied power, upon the enactment of the APrA
such power was preempted. Secondly, it seems anomalous that a lawyer has a right to practice
law granted to him by Congress under the APrA, and yet can effectively be denied this right
by an agency through its disciplinary proceeding. Lastly, confusing results among the agencies
could occur if each agency were left to determine its own power and the extent thereof. For a
discussion of these and other arguments why the SEC has no power to discipline attorneys,
see Brief for Appellant at 47-51, Kivitz v. SEC, Civil Action No. 71-1602. (D.C. Cir. 1972).
99. The Commission has promulgated the following provision concerning the scope of its
Rules of Practice:
These rules of practice are generally applicable to proceedings before the Commission
under the statutes which it administers, particularly those which involve a hearing or
opportunity for hearing before the Commission or its duly designated officer. In connection with any particular matter, reference should also be made to any special requirements of procedure and practice that may be contained in the particular statute involved
or the rules and forms adopted by the Commission thereunder, which special requirements are controlling. These rules do not apply to investigations, except where made
specifically applicable by the Rules Relating to Investigations. 17 C.F.R. § 201.1
(1972).
100. In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), on
appeal, Civil Action No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Kivitz, the Commission stated,
[t]his language [of Rule 2(e)(i), (ii)] does not limit our disciplinary control to cases of
misconduct committed in actual dealings with us or our staff, or, indeed, in connection
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Commission's opinion seems justified. If an attorney's general professionalism must be demonstrated, by virtue of the APrA, as a
prerequisite to admittance to practice before the SEC, the SEC pre-

sumably would have a valid interest in ensuring that those who later
demonstrate a lack of these requisite qualities can be suspended from

further SEC practice. 10 Consequently, the ultimate limitation upon

the scope of Rule 2(e) must be a constitutional one: there must be a

rational nexus between the offense being sanctioned and the objective
of the SEC in sanctioning the lawyer for that offense.0 2 In practice,
the Commission has kept within this limitation.
Groundsfor Bringing a Rule 2(e) Proceeding

In determining what types of attorney misconduct will constitute
grounds for initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the SEC did not
circumscribe its broad disciplinary powers by drafting Rule 2(e) nar-

rowly. Rather, since Rule 2(e) was drafted broadly,103 grounds for
initiation of Rule 2(e) disciplinary action appear to be limited only
by the scope of the Commission's power-constitutional, statutory,
or otherwise-to discipline attorney conduct. Therefore, core, peri-

pheral and non-securities conduct theoretically can be brought within
the reach of the SEC's Rule 2(e) proceedings and sanctions.

The grounds for which the SEC is authorized under Rule 2(e) to
with any form of practice before this Commission. But it is not necessary to decide here
whether we may discipline an attorney practicing before us on the basis of conduct
totally unrelated to Commission practice. Id. at 3.
101. The policy of protecting the public from abuses by persons licensed to practice
law requires that the standards of professional ethics regulate much more than those
aspects of a lawyer's professional activity which involve actual dealings with judicial or
administrative officers. Even personal conduct unconnected with the practice of law will
justify suspension or disbarment where it reflects on the integrity of the attorney involved.
Like acourt, an agency may protect itself and members of the public having business
before it from the misconduct of attorneys practicing before it even where the charges
of unethical conduct do not relate to practice before that agency. Brief for Appellee, at
48, Kivitz v. SEC, Civil Action No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
102. Cf Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1956).
103. This conclusion is reached in view of the original and express language of the Rule,
which provides:
The Commission may disqualify, and deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the
Commission after hearing in the matter
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or
(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or
improper professional conduct.
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1972).
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bring disciplinary action can be divided into three basic categories.
Rule 2(e)(1) authorizes the SEC to discipline an attorney where the
SEC finds the attorney "not to possess the requisite qualifications to
represent others," or "to be lacking in character or integrity or to
have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct," or "to
have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of
any provision of the federal securities laws."' 4 Before the SEC can
determine formally that the attorney possesses one of the above
grounds for discipline and therefore can be made subject to the SEC's
disciplinary sanctions, Rule 2(e)(1) requires the Commission to grant
a hearing to the attorney." 5 Hence, this procedural prerequisite for
effecting the first ground for taking disciplinary action became
known as a "qualification hearing."'0 6
In 1970, the SEC added a second and more specific class of
disciplinary grounds for invoking Rule 2(e)'s sanctions-a previously
adjudged suspension or disbarment, or the conviction of a felony or
a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." 7 If such grounds exist,
the SEC will suspend the attorney automatically under Rule 2(e)(2).
In 1971, the SEC incorporated the third and most narrow disciplinary ground into Rule 2(e). Under Rule 2(e)(3), an attorney can be
temporarily or permanently suspended from practice where a court
has permanently enjoined the attorney from further securities laws
violations or has found him to have violated such laws.' Moreover,
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Goldberg, supra note 65, at I.

107. Any attorney who has been suspended or disbarred by a Court of the United
States or in any State, Territory, District, Commonwealth, or Possession, or any person
whose license to practice as an accountant, engineer or other expert has been revoked
or suspended in any State, Territory, District, Commonwealth, or Possession, or any

person who has been convicted of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, shall be forthwith suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission.
A disbarment, suspension, revocation or conviction within the meaning of this
subparagraph (2) shall be deemed to have occurred when the disbarring, suspending,
revoking or convicting agency or tribunal enters its judgment or order, regardless of
whether appeal is pending or could be taken, and includes a judgment or order on a plea
of nolo contendere. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(2) (1972).
108. The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and without preliminary
hearing, may by order temporarily suspend from appearing or practicing before it any
attorney, accountant, engineer or other professional or expert who, on or after July I,
1971, has been by name:

(A) permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction by reason
of his misconduct in an action brought by the Commission from violation or
aiding and abetting the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws
(15 U.S.C. §§ 77a- to 80b-20) or of the rules and regulations thereunder; or

(B) found by any count of competent jurisdiction in an action brought by the
Commission to which he is a party or found by this Commission in any adminis-
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the amended rule provides that the attorney will be presumed "to
have been enjoined by reason of the misconduct alleged in the complaint" where he consents to a permanent injunction."'9 This express
incorporation of consent injunctions under the federal securities laws
as a ground for suspension under Rule 2(e) can produce at least two
undesirable results. First, to the extent that the attorney is not aware,
at the time of his original consent to the injunction, of the possibility
of a subsequent Rule 2(e)(3) proceeding against him, the imposition
in the later disciplinary proceeding of a suspension sanction based on
the consent injunction is an unanticipated, adverse consequence of the
attorney's settlement of the injunction suit and seems somewhat unfair. Furthermore, even if the attorney is aware of the threat of a
subsequent Rule 2(e)(3) disciplinary proceeding based on any injunction he might consent to, an indirect effect of this 1971 amendment
will be to force attorneys to litigate federal securities cases rather
than consent to an injunction. 10 The end result of the promulgation
of Rule 2(e)(3), therefore, may be an erosion of the policy considerations which favor the settlement of causes of action in civil cases.
the violation of any provision of the federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 77ato 80b-20) or of the rules and regulations thereunder (unless the violation was
found not to have been willful).
Id. § 201.2(e)(3).
109. In any hearing held on a petition filed in accordance with subdivision (ii) of this
subparagraph (3), the staff of the Commission shall show either that the petitioner has
been enjoined as described in paragraph (i)(A) or that the petitioner has been found to
have committed or aided and abetted violations as described in paragraph (i)(B) and that
showing, without more, may be the basis for censure or disqualification; that showing
having been made, the burden shall be upon the petitioner to show cause why he should
not be censured or temporarily or permanently disqualified from appearing and practicing before the Commission. In any such hearing the petitioner shall not be heard to
contest any findings made against him or facts admitted by him in the judicial or
administrative proceeding upon which the proceeding under this paragraph (3) is predicated, as provided in subparagraph (i) hereof. A person who has consented to the entry
of a permanent injunction as described in subparagraph (i)(A) of this paragraph (3)
without admitting the facts set forth in the complaint shall be presumed for all purposes
under this paragraph (3) to have been enjoined by reason of the misconduct alleged in
the complaint. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(iv).
110. For example, prior to the addition of section 3 to Rule 2(e) in 1971, an attorney could
forego the defense of a costly federal securities action by consenting to the imposition of an
injunction against him and thereby save himself undue expense and adverse publicity. However,
such an option is not, as a practical matter, available to the attorney after the 1971 amendment
because such a consent to an injunction is now tantamount to conceding defeat in a subsequent
Rule 2(e)(3) disciplinary proceeding.
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Rule 2(e) Procedure
SEC Selection of Disciplinary Method. With the exception of
the provisions of Rule 2(e)(2) for automatic suspension of attorneys
from SEC practice under certain circumstances, the SEC must take
several steps in bringing a Rule 2(e) proceeding. The initial step
involves a decision whether or not to bring a disciplinary action
against a given attorney. Discretion in this matter is given to the SEC
staff, whose decision will be based primarily on the findings of its
prior investigation of the particular lawyer. However, the attorney
himself may become involved in the decision process through written
correspondence and informal conferences-neither of which is publicly disclosed."' Although such subliminal action offers some potential for abuse, the secrecy which enshrouds this preliminary step can
be justified as protecting the attorney from unnecessary and harmful
publicity in the event that the charges are later found to be unsubstantiated.
Once the SEC has made the initial decision to seek disciplinary
action against a given attorney, the particular type of procedure to
be followed under Rule 2(e) is usually dictated by the nature of the
offense allegedly committed by the attorney. For example, a qualification hearing is the only procedure available in response to charges
of unethical attorney conduct." 2 However, for certain other offenses
the SEC may exercise discretion in choosing which Rule 2(e) procedure to employ." 3 Furthermore, if the SEC is unsuccessful in disciplining the attorney under the particular procedure selected, the SEC
is implicitly authorized to make a second attempt by means of the
alternative procedure. Rule 2(e)(6) negates any estoppel arguments
against the Commission by providing that "[a]ny proceeding brought
under any of the above sections shall not preclude a proceeding under
any other section.""'
Ill. This informal procedure was not consistently followed; consequently the Advisory
Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices has suggested "that where circumstances
permit, the Commission should as a general practice give a party against whom the staff
proposes to recommend proceedings an opportunity to present his own version of the facts by
affidavit or testimony under oath." ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at
19-20. The SEC has agreed to comply with this recommendation. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5310, (Oct. 4, 1972), reprintedin 1972 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,010,
112. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1972) with id. §§ 201.2(c)(2) and (3).
113. For example, certain securities laws violations may be disciplined under Rule
2(e)(l)(iii) or Rule 2(e)(3).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(6) (1972).
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Although the SEC may be presented with alternative procedures
for prosecuting a given offense, it often will find one procedure more
efficient or advantageous than the other. For example, certain
offenses, such as a willful violation of a federal securities law, can be
disciplined under either section 1 or section 3 of Rule 2(e).1 5 Yet,
there are several reasons why the latter route-Rule 2(e)(3)-is more
advantageous for the Commission to pursue."' First, Rule 2(e)(3)
affords the SEC the initial sanction of automatic temporary suspension from SEC practice of the adjudged securities law violators,
whereas the Commission can impose no sanction under Rule 2(e)(1)
until the requisite qualification hearing has been completed." 7 Furthermore, since the SEC is not required to hold a hearing under Rule
2(e)(3) unless the attorney petitions for such within 30 days of his
temporary suspension,"' it is possible that the Commission under
Rule 2(e)(3) can impose upon the disciplined attorney the ultimate
sanction-censure or permanent or temporary disqualification-without even expending the time and resources needed for the
conduct of a hearing.
Should the adjudged federal securities law violator elect to contest
his temporary suspension under Rule 2(e)(3) and apply for a hearing,
there nevertheless are relative advantages in the Rule 2(e)(3) hearing
procedure which enable the Commission to discipline the attorney
more effectively under section 3 of Rule 2(e) than under section 1.
First, the SEC in the subsequent hearing under Rule 2(e)(3) must
show only that a court has permanently enjoined the attorney or
found him to have committed the violation."' Once this initial showing is made, the burden shifts to the lawyer to show why he should
not be sanctioned. 2 Furthermore, in a Rule 2(e)(3) hearing the lawyer "cannot be heard to contest any findings made against him or
facts admitted by him in the [prior] judicial or administrative pro115. Id. §§ 201.2(e)(1), (3).
116. Rule 2(e)(l)(iii) provides that willfully violating a federal securities law is a ground

for a qualification hearing. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(l)(iii) (1972). In contrast, any violation
of a securities law is a sufficient ground for Rule 2(e)(3). See id. § 201.2(e)(3). Despite this

apparent difference in scope, it seems clear that Rule 2(e)(1) can be used for other securities
laws violations by relying on the general subsections (i) and (ii).
117. Compare id. § 201.2(e)(3)(i) with id. § 201.2(e)(1). This is assuming the temporary

suspension has not been ordered more than three months after a final judgment of the securities
law violation. See note 130 infra and accompanying text.

118. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(ii).
119. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(iv).
120. Id.
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ceeding . . . ." and where the lawyer has consented without admit-

ting anything, he will be subject to certain presumptions.')"
Rule 2(e)(1) DisqualificationProcedure. After the SEC has decided to seek disciplinary action against an attorney and has weighed
the relative merits of the alternative procedures available, the Rule
2(e)(l) qualification hearing, if chosen by the SEC as the method to
follow in a given case, provides a relatively simple procedure incorporating many safeguards for the disciplined attorney.
As discussed previously, the SEC is empowered to disbar an attorney from SEC practice pursuant to a Rule 2(e)(1) qualification
proceeding if the Commission finds that the attorney (1) is not qualified to represent others, or (2) is lacking in character or integrity or
has engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (3) has
willfully violated the federal securities laws. 22 The SEC's Rules of
Practice require that the Commission, in bringing disciplinary action
under Rule 2(e)(1), first give notice and a statement of the charges
to the attorney. 23 Thereafter a private hearing before an SEC hearing examiner is held, unless the Commission or the disciplined party
requests otherwise. 4
At the hearing stage, the attorney is afforded a fair investigation
and a reasonable opportunity to answer the charges. 5 In addition,
since the same adjudicatory and evidentiary rules used in other SEC
hearings are employed in the Rule 2(e)(1) qualification hearing, the
disciplined attorney is provided with uniform rules of evidence upon
which to rely. 126 This standardization is also important to the SEC
in that it ensures the use of evidentiary inferences-a tool made
121. See id.

122. Id. § 201.2(e)(1).
123. Id. For a discussion of the factors used in determining whether the SEC has afforded
satisfactory notice, see Initial Decision, In re Irwin L. Germaise and Thomas F. Quinn at 2123, SEC Administrative Proceeding, File No. 3-2606 (Oct. 29, 1971) (D. Markun, Hearing
Examiner).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(7). See note 61 supra. Although the SEC has recently changed
the title "hearing examiner" to "administrative law judge," SEC Securities Act Releases Nos.

5309, 5311 (Oct. 4, 1972), reprintedin 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.

79,009, 79,014, this

Comment will continue to use the former term.
125. See Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 706 (D.D.C. 1957), affd, 215 F.2d 919,
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958).
126. See generally Orrick, Organization, Procedures, and Practices of the SEC, 28 GnO.
WAsH. L. REv. 50 (1959); Timbers & Garfinkel, Examination of the Commission's Adjudicatory Process: Some Suggestions, 45 VA. L. REv. 817 (1959); Timbers, SEC Litigation- Before
the Commission and the Courts, 13 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 286 (1958).
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valuable because of the frequent lack of direct testimony in discipli-

nary proceedings.'

7

During the course of the qualification hearing, the hearing exam-

iner reviews all evidence and testimony, makes factual findings, and
then makes a final determination whether the attorney should be

sanctioned. After the hearing examiner has made his final determination, the disciplinary decision can be appealed to the Commission

itself. If an appeal is secured by the attorney or if the SEC determines
on its own initiative to review the hearing examiner's decision, the
Commission will then make an independent review of the facts and

2
charges and render its own findings. 1

Rule 2(e)(3) Procedurefor Temporary Suspension or Disqualification. The procedure followed in obtaining a temporary suspension and, ultimately, a temporary or permanent disqualification

under Rule 2(e)(3) is more detailed and intricate than the mechanics
of a Rule 2(e)(l) qualification proceeding. As soon as an attorney is

permanently enjoined by a court from violating the federal securities
laws or is convicted of such a violation, the SEC has the power under
Rule 2(e)(3) to suspend the attorney from SEC practice temporar-

ily,' provided that the order of temporary suspension is not entered
127. See, e.g., In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29,
1971), on appeal, No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
128. See, e.g., id. at I.
129. An order of temporary suspension shall become effective when served by certified or registered mail directed to the last known business or residence address of the
person involved. No order of temporary suspension shall be entered by the Commission
pursuant to this subdivision (i) more than three months after the final judgment or order
entered in a judicial or administrative proceeding described in subparagraph (a) or (b)
of this subdivision (i) has become effective upon completion of review or because further
review or appeal procedures are no longer available.
(ii) Any person temporarily suspended from appearing and practicing before the
Commission in accordance with subdivision (i) of this subparagraph (3) may, within
thirty days after service upon him of the order of temporary suspension, petition the
Commission to lift the temporary suspension. If no petition has been received by the
Commission within 30 days after service of the order by mail the suspension shall
become permanent.
(iii) Within 30 days after the filing of a petition in accordance with subdivision (ii)
of this subparagraph (3), the Commission shall either lift the temporary suspension or
set the matter down for hearing at a time and place to be designated by the Commission
or both, and after opportunity for hearing, may censure the petitioner or may disqualify
the petitioner from appearing or practicing before the Commission for a period of time
or permanently. In every case in which the temporary suspension has not been lifted,
every hearing held and other action taken pursuant to this subparagraph (3) shall be
expedited in every way consistent with the Commission's other responsibilities. 17
C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3) (1972).
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more than three months after the effective date of the final judgment
of the securities law injunction or violation. 3 ' After entering the
order of temporary suspension, the SEC must deliver the order to the
attorney.' 3 ' After being served with notice of the SEC order, the
attorney may, within thirty days, petition the Commission to lift the
temporary suspension. In the absence of such petition, "the suspension shall become permanent.' ' 3 Once the petition is filed, the SEC
must, within thirty days, either lift the suspension or schedule the
matter for a hearing. 3 If the SEC decides to hold a hearing, it
presumably will use the same procedures available under Rule 2(e)(1)
for the qualification hearing, except that Rule 2(e)(3) expressly requires the Commission to conduct the hearing in an expeditious manner. 3 After completion of the hearing, the SEC is empowered under
Rule 2(e)(3) to censure or disbar the35 attorney from SEC practice
permanently or for a period of time.
Sanctions Available to the SEC Under Rule 2(e)
With the exception of a Rule 2(e)(2) violation, which requiresthe
sanction of automatic suspension from SEC practice for attorneys
who are disbarred locally or convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude, 31 the Commission has discretion to impose a variety of sanctions in its disciplinary proceedings. In a qualification proceeding under Rule 2(e)(1), for example, the Rule expressly
provides that "[tlhe Commission may deny [an attorney], temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it
in any way,"'' 37 provided that the attorney is found to be unqualified,
lacking in character, or unethical, or to have willfully violated the
federal securities laws. This broad language certainly authorizes the
lesser sanction of censure. 38 Furthermore, Rule 2(e)(1) appears sufficiently broad to empower the SEC to impose fines upon disciplined
130. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(i).
131. Id.

132. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(ii).
133. Id.

134. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(iii) ("[E]very hearing held .

. .

pursuant to this subparagraph (3)

shall be expedited in every way consistent with the Commission's other responsibilities").
135. Id.

136. Id. § 201.2(e)(2).
137. Id. § 201.2(e)(1) (emphasis added).

138. See the opinion of Commissioner Needham, (concurring in part and dissenting in
part), In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971).
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attorneys, although the SEC to date has not done so.'
Contrary to the broad discretion which the SEC apparently has
in choosing sanctions under a Rule 2(e)(1) disqualification proceeding, the Commission's sanctioning authority appears to be more narrowly circumscribed under Rule 2(e)(3). Under the latter section,
where an attorney has been permanently enjoined or convicted by a
court for a federal securities law violation, the SEC is empowered to
impose only the sanctions of temporary suspension, censure or disqualification. 40
Despite the variable flexibility in the SEC to fashion sanctions
under different aspects of Rule 2(e), the sanction which will normally
be imposed by the Commission under that Rule can be characterized
either as an outright disqualification or a suspension from SEC practice. Either sanction is severe in several respects. The most dramatic
effect will occur when an entire law firm or partnership is enjoined
or convicted "by name" for a federal securities law violation. In such
a case, the suspension sanction of Rule 2(e)(3) will achieve the result
that "[p]artners and associates of a disqualified firm . . .may not
practice before the Commission so long as they remain members of
or associated with the firm." '' Even when the disciplinary measure
is limited to the individual lawyer, the sanctions are still severe since
the attorney is precluded, either permanently or during the suspension period, from participating in any aspect of securities or SEC
practice.'4 Furthermore, in addition to excluding the disqualified attorney from engaging personally in activities which are directly related to the SEC, the SEC has stated that the individual attorney may
not indirectly benefit in any way from his firm's securities practice)"
139. Consideration of the use of fines has been recommended in broker-dealer disciplinary
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 46. The availability
of fines is equally as desirable in attorney disciplinary proceedings since fines offer a less severe
sanction than suspension or disqualification but a more severe sanction than censure or a
suspended disqualification.

proceedings. See

140. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(ii) (1972).
141. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5147, at 3 (May 10, 1971), reprintedin 1971 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,064, at 80,313 and in 36 Fed. Reg. 8933, 8935 (1972).
142. See SEC v. Ezrine, F. Supp.
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1972), reportedin 164 BNA
SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-12 (1972). See also note 148 infra. This sanction as apparently
construed in Ezrine may be viewed as quite harsh since it bars the attorney from much of his
corporate practice.
143. Partners of a disqualified individual may not permit such persons to participate
to any extent in matters coming before the Commission, to participate in profits from
their Commission business or to hold himself out as entitled to practice before the
Commission. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5147 (May 10, 1971), reprinted in 1971
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,064, at 80,313; and in 36 Fed. Reg. 8933, 8935 (1972).

1000

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1972:969

Hence, the disqualified attorney is barred from the receipt of profits
from the firm's SEC business.'44
The first judicial definition of the .breadth and severity of the
disqualification sanctions available to the SEC under Rule 2(e) was
4 5 In that case, attorney Ezrine
recently articulated in SEC v. EzrineY
had been permanently enjoined from further securities laws violations
based on his wrongdoing in connection with a public offering. 4 ' In
April, 1972, acting in response to the permanent injunction, the SEC
temporarily suspended Ezrine from SEC practice. The suspension
became permanent in May, 1972 after Ezrine had pleaded guilty to
a felony count for violation of Federal Reserve Board Regulation
T. 47 Nevertheless, Ezrine ignored the suspension and represented
certain parties in an SEC hearing examiner proceeding. In further
disregard of his permanent disqualification from SEC practice, Ezrine continued to serve as house counsel for a registered broker/dealer, advising and assisting the broker with respect to federal
securities laws and SEC transactions.
The SEC, seeking judicial aid in its efforts to preclude Ezrine
from practice before the Commission, filed a suit to enjoin Ezrine
from further appearance and practice before the Commission. In
addition, the SEC requested in its complaint that Ezrine (1) be required to disclose his Rule 2(e) disqualification from SEC practice
to all those who might seek his services with respect to matters arising
under the federal securities laws and (2) be restrained from receiving
or retaining any legal fees for services rendered during the period of
disqualification. The district court agreed that an injunction was necessary, granted all the SEC requests, and issued a permanent injunction which encompassed such a wide variety of activities that Ezrine
could no longer, as a practical matter, influence the investing public
in any capacity without violating the injunction.' Since the court's
144. Id.
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1972), reported in 164 BNA SEc. Ruo. & L.
F. Supp. 145. REP. A-12 (1972).
146. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd,
458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
147. See In re Ivan Allen Ezrine, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5268 (July 7, 1972). See
also SEC Litigation Release No. 5477 (July 25, 1972). Regulation T is promulgated in 12
C.F.R. § 220 (1972).

148. In granting the injunction, Judge Frankel prohibited Ezrine from further "securities
practice":

(A) Participating directly or indirectly, in a representative capacity, in
(I) any administrative proceeding or investigation instituted by order of the
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injunction in essence gave judicial sanction to the SEC's original Rule
2(e) disqualification order, the breadth of the injunction issued in

Ezrine can be interpreted as a judicial resolution and approval of the
expansive SEC sanctioning power within Rule 2(e) itself.
Although the sanctions available to the SEC under Rule 2(e) are

broad and drastic, they need not be employed to the fullest extent
possible. For example, the SEC has the power to alleviate a sanction

imposed by the hearing examiner which it considers to be too severe. "' 9 Sanctions can be mitigated by either the hearing examiner or

the Commission where the conduct and character of the offender
subsequent to the commission of the offense have been exemplary.'

Other factors which may influence the decision to reduce a sanction

are the age and physical condition of the violator, 5' the length of time
since the violation occurred,' and the attorney's conduct prior to the

commission of the offense.' The SEC, however, does not always
follow a consistent pattern in reviewing the Rule 2(e) sanctions imposed by hearing examiners and sometimes has increased the harshness of the disciplinary sanction originally imposed or has failed to
plaintiff Commission;
(2) any formal or informal conference with the jurisdiction of the Commission; or
(3) in connection with any matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission
at such time as it appears or reasonably should appear that a proceeding or
investigation will be instituted by the Commission in connection therewith, other
than communications incidental to the conduct of litigation other than litigation
before the Commission;
(B) Representing or advising any entity or person in connection with the preparation
or filing of such documents as may be required to be filed with the plaintiff Commission
under the federal securities laws; and
(C) Representing, in connection with any matter arising under or related to the federal
securities laws, any broker or dealer in securities, investment company, or investment
adviser, registered or required to be registered with the plaintiff Commission. 164 BNA
SEc. REG. & L. REP. at A-12.
149. See In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971). It
should be noted that the converse situation-a hearing examiner's sanction which is too lenient-has also arisen. E.g., In re Albert J. Fleischmann, 37 S.E.C. 832, 836 (1950).
150. See In re Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971). However, the
Commission was also quick to point out that beginning with the initiation of the proceedings
the attorney has "acted on notice that his conduct might be under scrutiny."
151. E.g., In re Nathan Wechsler, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6932 (Nov.
5, 1962).
152. See the opinion of Commissioner Needham (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
in the Kivitz case. In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29,
1971).
153. See In re Albert J. Fleischmann, 37 S.E.C. 832, 836 (1950).
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mitigate a sanction which seemed clearly unjustified. 54
Settlement of DisciplinaryProceedings
The SEC can, and frequently does, terminate a Rule 2(e) proceed-

ing by negotiating a settlement via a consent or stipulation with the
disciplined attorney.'

A settlement may have distinct advantages to

each of the parties involved. The SEC staff through the means of a
settlement can forestall further depletion of the limited resources it
has available for disciplinary proceedings and avoid the risk of losing
on the merits. At the same time, the settlement method has several
advantages for the disciplined attorney. First, the attorney is able to
avoid prolonged and undue adverse publicity. Furthermore, the sanction agreed upon is seldom more severe than the sanction which
would have been imposed upon the final adjudication of a Rule 2(e)
proceeding.'

Finally, a negotiated settlement may be conducive to

reinstatement of the attorney to SEC practice.'57
In the past, there have been several elements comprising settle-

ment agreements. Generally, the attorney must admit to the SEC
allegations contained in the statement of notice and hearing, must
withdraw from further appearance and practice before the SEC, and
must agree to seek SEC approval prior to any future practice before
the Commission.'

Apparently, the Commission is adhering to these

elements in its recent Rule 2(e) settlements.'
154. For example, in the recent disciplinary action of In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), the SEC ignored an apparently justifiable opportunity to impose a more lenient sanction. In Kivitz, the SEC investigation was initiated five years
after the offense occurred; two years later, the Rule 2(e) proceeding was brought. Kivitz'
conduct prior to the alleged offense, and his conduct in the succeeding seven years, had been
exemplary. In view of these factors, Commissioner Needham, in his dissent, felt only a formal
censure was warranted. However, the majority of the Commissioners felt otherwise and suspended Kivitz from SEC practice for a period of two years.
155. E.g., In re Sol M. Alpher, 39 S.E.C. 346 (1959); In re Arnold D. Naidich, SEC
Securities Act Release No.4372 (June 8, 1961) (the disciplinary order was entered on the basis
of a stipulation); In re Nathan Wechsler, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6932 (Nov.
5, 1962).
156. Compare the sanctions imposed in Rule 2(e) settlements, cited in notes 158-59 hlifra,
with the sanctions imposed under a Rule 2(e) proceeding, cited in notes 149-54.
157. See. e.g., In re Thomas F. Blonquist, SEC Litigation Release No. 5397 (May 25,
1972); cf. In re Elliot S. Blair, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9666 (July 14, 1972).
158. E.g., In re Arnold D. Naidich, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4372 (June 8, 1961);
In re Nathan Wechsler, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6932 (Nov. 5, 1962); In re
Erwin Pincus and Pace Reich, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4619 (June 27, 1963); In re
Leonard Nikoloric, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4642 (Sept. 19, 1963).
159. E.g., In re Elliot S. Blair, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9666 (July 14,
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The use of settlements in Rule 2(e) proceedings has been criticized
on the basis that premature termination prevents the SEC from
60

molding and further defining the substantive law of Rule 2(e).1

Without express resolution of the confines of Rule 2(e), it becomes

difficult for attorneys to become fully informed of what conduct
should be avoided. However, the countervailing considerations which
support the use of settlement agreements seem to prevail. The deficiencies in developing the substantive law aspects of Rule 2(e) can be

remedied by the SEC through careful, precise drafting of its Rule 2(e)
charges. 6 ' At the same time, a settlement agreement allows an attorney to avoid adverse publicity which may injure even his non-SEC

practice. Thus, the lawyer who settles with the SEC can ensure that
he will receive a sanction commensurate with the offense and not

aggravated by any stigma carried over from the harmful publicity of
an SEC disciplinary proceeding.
Readmittance to SEC Practice
Prior to 1971, Rule 2(e) did not expressly provide a method for

readmitting a suspended attorney to SEC and securities practice, and
the appropriate method of reinstatement often had to be implied from

the nature of the sanction originally imposed. Thus, if the SEC suspended an attorney from practice for two years, the attorney presumably had an implied right to be readmitted to practice automatically

upon termination of the suspension period.6 2 When the lawyer was
indefinitely suspended from SEC practice or consented not to prac-

tice in a settlement agreement, the method of reinstatement was not
as clear. Apparently, under these circumstances a reapplication was
16 3
required and readmittance was subject to the SEC's discretion.

1972); In re Thomas R. Blonquist, SEC Litigation Release No. 5397 (May 25, 1972).
160. See Kemp, supra note 65, at 42.
161. Id. at 42-43.
162. It is not clear whether an implied right to readmission upon termination of the suspension period existed prior to the enactment of the APrA. However, after the Act, it can be argued
that when the attorney's sanction has expired, his right under the APrA to practice before any
federal agency-including the SEC-governs. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
Furthermore, since the SEC has also provided that an attorney suspended under Rule 2(e)(2)
must be readmitted to practice when his local disciplinary sanction terminates, by analogy, the
attorney tnut be readmitted when his SEC disciplinary sanction terminates. See text following
note 168 infra.
163. In the case of permanent disqualification any action by the Commission on a
petition for reinstatement would appear to be wholly discretionary. The Commission
would not be confined to those matters appearing in its public files of the instant
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The deficiencies and uncertainties surrounding the right to and
method of readmittance to SEC practice were partially remedied by
the 1971 amendments to Rule 2(e).114 Under Rule 2(e)(4), the applicable reinstatement procedure depends upon the type of disciplinary
proceeding originally used to suspend the attorney.'65 Accordingly,
the first method of readmittance, specified in Rule 2(e)(4)(i), applies
only to permanent disqualifications and suspensions imposed under
Rule 2(e)(1) and (3). The Rule 2(e)(4)(i) procedure provides that the
permanently disbarred attorney may at any time apply for readmittance, may at the discretion of the SEC be afforded a hearing, and
must show "good cause" in order to be reinstated.
The second method of readmittance, specified in Rule 2(e)(4)(ii)
and declared applicable to automatic suspensions under Rule 2(e)(2),
provides that the attorney shall be reinstated, upon appropriate application, where "all the grounds for application of the provisions of
[Rule 2(e)(2)] are subsequently removed" because the underlying
prior adjudged violation is reversed or the non-SEC suspension or
disbarment has been terminated.' In addition, an attorney suspended under Rule 2(e)(2) may apply for reinstatement at any time,
even if the underlying conviction or disbarment has not been overturned or terminated. In this event, the lawyer must be accorded an
opportunity for a hearing,6 7 and, similar to the Rule 2(e)(4)(i) reinstatement applicant who was disciplined originally 'under Rules
2(e)(1) and (3), the attorney must show good cause in order to be
readmitted.
petitioner, but could look at any of its files which have bearing on the matter. Kemp,
supra note 65, at 43 n.42.

164. (4)(i) An application for reinstatement of a person permanently suspended or disqualified under paragraphs (1) or (3) of this paragraph (e) may be made at any time, and the
applicant may, in the Commission's discretion, be afforded a hearing; however, the suspension
or disqualification shall continue unless and until the applicant has been reinstated by the
Commission for good cause shown.

(ii) Any person suspended under subparagraph (2) of this paragraph (e) shall be reinstated by the Commission, upon appropriate application, if all the grounds for application of

the provisions of that subparagraph are subsequently removed by a reversal of the conviction
or termination of the suspension, disbarment or revocation. An application for reinstatement

on any other grounds by any person suspended under subparagraph (2) of this paragraph (e)
may be filed at any time and the applicant shall be accorded an opportunity for a hearing in

the matter; however, such suspension shall continue unless and until the applicant has been
reinstated by order of the Commission for good cause shown. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(4) (1972).
165. Compare id. § 201.2(e)(4)(i) with id. § 201.2(e)(4)(ii).

166. Id. § 201.2(e)(4)(ii).
167. Id.
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Unfortunately, the 1971 amendments do not expressly consider

readmittance after a "suspension" to which an attorney consents in
a settlement agreement or a temporary suspension under Rule 2(e)(1)
or 2(e)(3). However, it seems apparent that unless the SEC provides
otherwise in its original suspension order,'68 an attorney who is suspended only temporarily under either section 1 or section 3 of Rule
2(e) should have the right to readmittance as soon as the suspension

is terminated or lifted. As discussed previously, for example, an attorney who is suspended from general law practice by local proceedings
and thereby suspended automatically from SEC practice by Rule

2(e)(2) has an express right to be reinstated by virtue of Rule
2(e)(4)(ii), without any need to show "good cause," in cases where

the underlying local suspension from law practice is later termi-

nated. 6 ' It would appear consistent to grant the same right to reinstatement, upon proper application, and unless the SEC provides

otherwise in its original suspension order, to an attorney whose temporary suspension from SEC practice was imposed originally by Rule
2(e)(1) or 2(e)(3) itself.
Judicial Relief
Rule 2(e) does not provide for any type of judicial relief for a

SEC-disciplined attorney. The availability of relief priorto the completion of a Rule 2(e) proceeding is limited; pursuant to Schwebel v.

SEC,'" for example, it is not possible to enjoin the Commission from
168. Cf In re Leonard A. Nikoloric, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4642 (Sept. 19,
1963) (in which the SEC requested the attorney to reapply for practice). An alternative argument to support this right of readmission is based on the APrA. See notes 95-96 supra. In
essence, once the attorney's SEC sanction has terminated, the right to practice granted by the
APrA governs.
169. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(2) (1972).
170. 153 F. Supp. 701 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958). In Schvebel, the court summarily dismissed the attorney's
complaint and thereupon rejected his motion for a preliminary injunction. The SEC had made
three contentions-plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, he had alleged
no legal cognizable injury, and the Commission had acted properly in bringing the action. The
court did not require exhaustion of remedies; instead, it viewed the irreparable injury exception
as applicable, since at stake was "the peculiar delicacy of an attorney's good reputation, his
chief asset in his profession, and the fact that some members of the public may assume guilt
from disbarment proceedings despite final exoneration." 153 F. Supp. at 704. However, the
court held that the SEC had the power to discipline attorneys, and had done so properly in
this case.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed per curiam, holding
that the attorney had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In addition, the appellate
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bringing a disciplinary action. However, the availability of judicial
relief to the disciplined attorney after termination of the SEC proceeding has long been recognized by the SEC and the courts.'
Enforcement of an SEC-imposed disciplinary sanction may be
stayed either by a court or the SEC, pending judicial review of the
Rule 2(e) proceeding.7 2 Since the judicial granting of a stay is consid-

ered "extraordinary relief," a petitioning attorney bears a heavy burden in justifying his right to a stay.7 3 Arguably, the availability of
such relief should be even more limited in Rule 2(e) cases since the

Commission's ability to achieve quick and decisive action against a
continuing threat to the investing public is undermined whenever the

SEC sanctions and suspensions are judicially stayed. However, the
availability of this relief does not appear to be so limited, for in Kivitz
v. SEC 7 1 the attorney's motion for a stay was granted despite the
7
vigorous opposition of the Commission. 1
Judicial review of an SEC disciplinary proceeding can be secured

pursuant to the various judicial review provisions of the federal securities acts, which provide the requisite jurisdictional source for the
petitioning attorney.'7 The reviewing court is limited by the federal
securities laws and the APA in the scope of review which it may
exercise, and it must sustain the SEC's disciplinary findings once it
finds they are supported by substantial evidence. 77 The real problem,
court stated that the district court was in error in reaching the question of the authority of the
Commission to disbar.
171. See Kivitz v. SEC, No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where judicial review is presumed
by both parties.
172. See, e.g., Kivitz v. SEC, No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where Kivitz was granted a
15-day stay by the Commission until he could obtain a judicial stay. Commission
Announcement, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NEWS DIGEST, July 28, 1971, at I
(Issue No. 71-145). Soon thereafter the court of appeals did grant Kivitz a stay pending judicial
review of his SEC disciplinary proceeding.
173. E.g., Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Under Virginia Petroleum, a movant for a stay must show: (1) he is likely to prevail on the
merits of his appeal; (2) without a stay he will suffer irreparable injury; (3) the issuance of a
stay will not substantially harm other persons interested in the proceedings; and (4) there will
be no harm to the public interest if a stay is granted.
174. In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), on
appeal, Civil Action No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
175. See Memorandum of the SEC in Opposition to Petitioner's (Kivitz) Motion for a Stay
of the Effectiveness of an Order of the Commission Pending Review, In re Murray A. Kivitz,
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), on appeal, No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 197 1).
176. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y(a), 79x(a), 80a-42(a), 80b-13(a) (1970).
177. E.g., Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974 (1949). See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970),
and the statutes cited in note 176 supra. The two other judicial review sections of the federal
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therefore, lies in the determination of what constitutes substantial
evidence, an issue which becomes difficult where there is conflicting,
unsubstantiated, or circumstantial evidence.' 8
Kivitz v. SEC: JudicialReview of Rule 2(e) Proceedings
The pending case of Kivitz v. SEC179 represents the first instance
ofjudicial review of a Rule 2(e) proceeding and presents an opportunity for the judiciary to eliminate many of the uncertainties underlying
Rule 2(e). In Kivitz, the SEC initiated a Rule 2(e) proceeding against
an attorney who allegedly had served as a contact for an unscrupulous
person who planned to gain SEC approval of a registration statement
by bribing various influential people.' Basing its case on conflicting
evidence, hearsay testimony, and circumstantial evidence, the SEC
sought to establish that Kivitz lacked the requisite character and
integrity to engage in SEC practice and therefore should be disquali1
fied from practice under Rule 2(e)(1). 81
The hearing examiner in Kivitz made the initial findings that the
APrA did not "divest the Commission of its long-recognized and
long-exercised power to discipline attorneys practicing before it
. . .,,,2 and that clear and convincing proof was required, and had
been shown. The hearing examiner then found that Kivitz had exhibited unethical and improper conduct within Rule 2(e) by allowing a
lay intermediary to exploit Kivitz' SEC privilege and by setting legal
fees contrary to canons 34 and 35 of the ABA Canons of Ethics.',,
Consequently, the hearing examiner determined under Rule 2(e) that
Kivitz should be denied the privilege of practicing before the SEC.
securities laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i(a), vvv(a), refer only to "supported by evidence." However,
this distinction is apparently a matter of semantics. Cf. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION

1931 n.43 (2d ed. 1961).
178. See, e.g., In re Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29,

1971).
179. No. 71-1602 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

180. Kivitz attended a meeting at which time the final plan to clear the registration statement was discussed. Allegedly, Kivitz wrote the terms of this illegal agreement on paper bearing
his letterhead. In addition, his fee charged was substantially above the amount which he had
charged for similar services in the past. The retainer was never accepted by the issuing company, and no attempt was made to illegally clear the registration statement. However, five years

after this incident, the SEC brought disciplinary charges against Kivitz for his involvement in
an attempted illegal registration.
181. For a discussion of Rule 2(e)(l), see notes 122-28 supra and accompanying text.
182. Initial Decision, In re Murray A. Kivitz, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-1972,

at 2-3, 5-8, 21-23 (April 17, 1970) (Markun, Hearing Examiner).
183. Id. at 24 n.34.
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On review before the Commission, the SEC affirmed the hearing
examiner's determination of Kivitz' disqualification and entered an
order denying Kivitz the privilege of practicing before the SEC.)8 4 In
its opinion, the SEC indicated that a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than the examiner's standard of clear and convincing proof,
was the proper standard of proof for the SEC in a Rule 2(e) proceeding, since a Rule 2(e) proceeding did not affect the attorney's general
practice but only his "privilege to practice before [the SEC]."' 85 Nevertheless, the Commission decided that the evidence against Kivitz
satisfied the more stringent standard of clear and convincing evidence
as well.' The Commission also rejected an argument that the SEC
had no power to discipline attorneys under Rule 2(e) or, alternatively,
that unrelated securities conduct was not within the scope of whatever
power the Commission did have.'87 However, the SEC went on to
note that Kivitz' conduct could be conceptualized as "peripherally
related" since it was ancillary to the filing of a registration statement. Kivitz thereupon obtained a judicial stay of the SEC sanction
pending further judicial review.
Although the appeal from Kivitz v. SEC is still pending, 8 it
seems likely that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit will affirm the SEC suspension of Kivitz by finding that there
was substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. More
importantly, Kivitz gives the appellate court the opportunity to hold
squarely that the Commission does have the power to discipline attorneys. ' Because more than fifteen other federal agencies discipline
attorneys and regulate their conduct from a similar source of power,
this aspect of the Kivitz case could have catastrophic results if no
disciplinary authority were found.' The opinion should also provide
a judicial resolution of the burden of proof which the SEC must meet
in a Rule 2(e) proceeding and a determination of the type of evidence
which the Commission can consider in imposing the ultimate discipli184. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), reprinted in 29 AD. L.2D 361

(1972).
185. Id. at 3 n.2, 29 AD. L. 2D at 363 n.2.
186. Id.

187. This language does not limit our disciplinary control to cases of misconduct
committed in actual dealings with us or our staff, or, indeed, in connection with any form
of practice before this Commission. Id. at 4, 29 AD. L.2D at 369.
188.
1972. A
189.
190.

Oral argument was scheduled for June, 1972; however, it was postponed until October,
decision should be forthcoming at the time of publication of this article.
Such a holding has been long advocated. See Kemp, supra note 65, at 26.
See note 37 supra.

Vol. 1972:969]

ATTORNEY CONDUCT

1009

nary sanction. Despite the strong arguments on both of these points
advanced by Kivitz, the court in all likelihood will approve the SEC's
adoption of the lesser burden of proof-a "preponderance of the
evidence" rather than "clear and convincing proof"-and probably
will allow the Commission broad discretion in imposing sanctions.''
Rule 2(e) in Perspective

The present operation of Rule 2(e) is in general consistent with
the model proposed in this Comment for the regulation of attorney
conduct. For example, the severity of Rule 2(e) treatment varies in
proportion to the potential harmfulness of the offense to the investing
public; while at the same time, the attorney is afforded a number of
procedural safeguards in the Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceeding.' 92 Furthermore, the apparent severity of Rule 2(e)'s censure, suspension,
and disqualification sanctions is mitigated by the fact that the SEC
has directed its disciplinary proceedings at attorney misconduct
which is patently offensive.9 3 Finally, the incorporation in recent
Rule 2(e) amendments of automatic disciplinary action triggered by
the consummation of certain non-SEC controls-automatic suspension from SEC practice under Rule 2(e)(2), for example, for attorneys who are disbarred locally or convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude-is understandable in view of the
spiraling demands placed upon its limited staff and resources. Armed
with these recent amendments, the Commission is empowered to
trigger outside controls automatically without suffering any burden
of affirmative action, thereby freeing SEC resources to be directed
elsewhere.
Despite the recent attempts to reshape and fortify Rule 2(e), there
remain a number of-deficiencies in the operation and structure of the
rule. First, the existence of vague and ambiguous terms raises consti191. See notes 82-90 supra and accompanying text.
192. See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text. The SEC has always attempted to
balance the interests of the attorney with those of the public:
The overall purpose of the [1971] amendment is to prevent situations in which the
investing public places its trust in, or reliance upon, attorneys . . . who have demon-

strated an unwillingness or inability to comply with the requirements of the federal
securities laws, while assuring that such professionals . . . will have a fair opportunity
to show why the interests of the investing public will not be materially jeopardized if
they are permitted to continue to appear and practice before the Commission. 36 Fed.
Reg. 8933, 8935 (1972).
193. See Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 1155, 1156 (1972).
See also Kemp, supra note 65, at 42.
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tutional questions and creates numerous enforcement problems.,9 4
Second, the lengthy time delays incurred before a proceeding is finally brought are unfair to the attorney; a remedial provision, such
as a statute of limitations, is needed to afford the requisite protection
for the attorney.' 95 Furthermore, express elimination of estoppel concepts in Rule 2(e) could lead to harassment through a multiplicity of
disciplinary proceedings.' Finally, the operation of Rule 2(e)'s temporary suspension procedure is rigid and may be unfair under certain
circumstances. For example, an attorney who consents, for reasons
beyond his control, to an injunction for a securities law violation may
have a severe handicap in a subsequent Rule 2(e)(3) proceeding,
where the imposition of an injunction against the attorney, albeit with
his consent, is sufficient grounds for automatic suspension from SEC
practice.'9 7 At present, the only safeguard in this type of situation is
the Commission's sense of fair play.
Despite the increased scope and frequency of Rule 2(e) proceedings in recent years, it is still apparent that the Rule is directed
towards regulating a narrow area of securities conduct-the attorney's intentional and flagrant disregard of the federal securities
laws. 18 SEC disciplinary actions as presently designed are incapable
of achieving regulation of attorney conduct on any comprehensive or
refined basis, and a substantial burden of affirmative action remains
on the Commission to employ local, non-automatic disciplinary measures through Rule 2(e)(1). 99 In order to protect the investing public
from anything less than flagrant disregard by the attorney of his
professional duties, therefore, it becomes necessary to impose a
194. See notes 82-90 supra and accompanying text.
195. The SEC has implicitly recognized the unfairness that may result in a delayed disciplinary proceeding. In a Rule 2(e)(3) proceeding, the SEC itself is required to enter an order within
90 days of the final judgment of a securities offense. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1972).
196. See notes 113-14 supra and accompanying text.
197. See note 110 supra. See also notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text. Rule 2(e)(3)
was originally announced in a version similar to the present provision. See 35 Fed. Reg. 15441

(1970). There was some critical commentary, consisting of two letters of public response. Letter
from Stephen Crystal to Orval DuBois, Sept. 30, 1970; Letter from Mark Rollinson to Securi-

ties & Exchange Commission, Oct. 2, 1970. Both letters raised a numuer of problems, including
constitutional ones. However, despite this criticism, the final version is much harsher than the
one which was originally proposed. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3) (1972) with 35 Fed. Reg.
15441 (1970).
198. See disciplinary proceedings cited in notes 64, 66, 70. See generally Kemp, supra note
65; Goldberg, supra note 65.
199. For a discussion of the problems which such reliance on other controls may encounter,
see notes 14-45 supra and accompanying text.
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threshold duty upon the attorney to insure that his and his client's
everyday conduct is proper."' The SEC is attempting to implement
judicially this broader scope of lawyer responsibility in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp."'
EXPANDING ATTORNEY DUTIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS

Existing Attorney Liability Under the FederalSecurities Laws
The attorney, like any other person, has always been under a duty
to comply with the federal securities laws. 2 Among the more likely
statutory bases of liability for the attorney are sections 11 and 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933203 and sections 10(b) and 18(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.204 For violations of these laws, the
attorney may be subject to a variety of enforcement actions, including
civil, criminal, and Rule 2(e) proceedings. 2 Adjudication of civil
liability resulting in a damage judgment against the attorney has been
rare; furthermore, there is evidence that some attorneys and law firms
have taken "practical responses" in order to minimize the impact of
monetary damages.0 However, injunctive relief for an attorney's
violations of federal securities laws has frequently been granted in
recent years, 2 7 with each case involving an intentional or knowing
violation .208 Instances of criminal liability have occurred, but in each
29
case SEC prosecution was directed at "fairly patent frauds.1
200. To a certain extent the attorney must do so under the federal securities laws. See notes
202-09 infra and accompanying text. However, it is clear that under existing case law, the
attorney has received minimum judicial consideration of his role in securities regulation. See
notes 210-11 infra and accompanying text.
201. Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 1972). The SEC complaint for injunctive
and other relief is partially reprinted in 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,360.
202. See generally Note, "BarChris" and the Securities Acts, supra note 3.
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1 (1970).
204. Id. §§ 78j(b), r(a).
205. See Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities,supra note 193, at 1155-60; Note,
"BarChris" and the Securities Acts, supra note 3.
206. The responses include refusing to handle registration work, obtaining an indemnification agreement, obtaining a release from a client, and purchasing malpractice insurance for
liability for misrepresentations in securities matters. See Note, "BarChris" and the Securities
Acts, supra note 3, at 368-73. For a criticism of liability in cases involving attorney misstatements, see Knauss, supra note 6, at 57-60.
207. Karmel, supra note 193, at 1156.
208. Id.
209. Id. See also United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 984 (1962).
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Originally, attorneys were not subject to special rules or duties
under the federal securities laws.210 Furthermore, the attorney's involvement in a securities law violation by virtue of his professional
status was seldom expressly considered by a court.2"' Consequently,
for many years there were no explicit guidelines to aid the attorney
in performing his proper role in the regulation of public investment.
2t and Escott
Of the few cases to consider the issue, SEC v. Frank1
v. BarChris Construction Corp.,213 involving misstatements in an
offering circular and registration statement, respectively, provide the
only determinable criteria for establishing attorney liability under the
federal securities laws. In Frank, an attorney assisted his client, a
manufacturing company, in the preparation of an offering circular
but had no knowledge of the allegedly false nature of the technical
information supplied by his client in describing the company's primary product. On procedural grounds, the Second Circuit reversed
the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the attorney for violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. However, in dicta, the court established two standards
for attorney liability based on the intentional and negligent misconduct of the attorney with reference to his client's violations of the
federal securities laws.
According to the Frank court, an attorney can be held liable for
misrepresentations in an offering circular or prospectus when he has
assisted in the preparation of the statements and has actual knowledge of the misrepresentations contained therein;21 1 such conduct is
tantamount to a knowing violation of the federal securities laws.
Furthermore, even if he is not aware of the misstatements in an
offering circular or similar document, the attorney who assists in the
drafting of such documents will be liable where the misleading infor210. Attorneys are not primary targets of the Securities Acts since, in their professional capacity, they are neither issuers nor "buyers" and "sellers." However, the Secur-

ities Acts do attempt to regulate the conduct of individuals who, while they are not
"buyers" or "sellers," may become liable because they are peripherally connected with
purchases and sales. An attorney, by virtue of the professional advice which he renders
in the preparation of a registration statement, is such an individual peripherally connected with purchases and sales. Note, "BarChris" and the Securities Acts, supra note
3, at 361.
See also Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965).
211. Karmel, supra note 193, at 1156. E.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863
(2d Cir. 1964).
212. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), noted in Karmel, supra note 193, at 1157.
213. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
214. 388 F.2d at 489.
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mation is actually presented to him by his client and where, as a nonexpert in technical matters, he has the ability to "readily understand"
or "recognize" its falsity. 215 The standards were summarized by the

court as follows:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard
to securities which he knows to be false simply because his client has furnished
it to him. At the other extreme it would be unreasonable to hold a lawyer who
was putting his client's description of a chemical process into understandable
English to be guilty of fraud simply because of the failure to detect discrepancies between their description and technical reports available to him in a
physical sense but beyond his ability to understand. . . .The SEC's position
is that Frank had been furnished with information which even a non-expert
would recognize as showing the falsity of many of the representations ....
If this is so, the Commission would be entitled to prevail; a lawyer, no more
than others, can escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw
and could readily understand.116

In view of the court's language, the Frank case appears to represent

the first judicial recognition of an attorney's duty of reasonable care
with reference to the preparation of securities filings. After the Frank

decision, the attorney who helps his client draft an offering circular
can be held liable for negligently failing to detect and resolve discrep-

ancies which a non-expert should be able to recognize from the material supplied by the client. Thus, the federal securities laws would

appear to have the capacity to control21 7core securities conduct of the
attorney which is negligent in nature.
Although the attorney's liability for negligence in Frank was es-

tablished in connection with discrepancies which the attorney could

"readily understand," as a non-expert, from the face of material

actually presented to him by his client, the Second Circuit raised the
possibility that this standard would not be an absolute limit on the

types of attorney conduct which can be redressed by a liability-fornegligence standard.218 In this regard, the Frank court left open the
possibility of the existence of a broader attorney duty to inquire

independently into any discrepancies of which he has constructive
notice:
Whether the fraud sections of the securities laws go beyond this and require a
lawyer passing on an offering circular to run down possible infirmities in his
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Cf SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., 1971 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,232
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Karmel, supra note 193, at 1156. See notes 225, 228 infra. Cf SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., CCH 1972 FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,637 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (suggesting reliance
may be necessary where an attorney is negligent).
218. 388 F.2d at 489.
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client's story of which he has been put on notice, and if so what efforts are
required of him, is a closer question on which it is important that the court be
seized of the precise facts including the extent . . . to which his role went
2 9
beyond a lawyer's normal one. 1

Escott v. BarChris seemed to answer and go beyond the question
left open in Frank by implying that the attorney may be required to
conduct a reasonable, independent investigation of all information in
the non-expert portions of a registration statement.22 1 In BarChris,
purchasers of convertible debentures successfully brought suit under
section II of the Securities Act against various directors and officers
of BarChris, all of whom had signed a registration statement filed
with the SEC which contained misstatements and omissions of material facts. Among the defendants sued were two attorneys. One attorney, who served as house counsel and secretary for BarChris but was
not considered a member of BarChris' inside management, had
signed several amendments to the registration statement. The other
attorney, who was a member of BarChris' outside-counsel law firm
and also a director of BarChris, had drafted and signed the registration statement for the debentures. Both attorneys pleaded the affirmative, "due diligence" defense provided by section 11 of the Securities Act for any person who, after reasonable investigation of the nonexpert portions of the registration statement, had "reasonable ground
to believe and did believe

. . .

that the statements therein were true

' 22
and that there was no omission to state a material fact. '
In holding both attorneys liable for the misrepresentations in the
registration statement, the BarChris court determined that each attorney had a duty under section 11 of the Securities Act "to make a
reasonable investigation of the truth of all the statements in the unexpertised portion of the document which he signed. 212 It is clear,
however, that the attorneys in BarChriswere being treated primarily
in their roles as directors and/or signers of the registration statement. 23 Consequently, the precise holding of the decision does not
219. Id.
220. See Israels, Preparationof RegistrationStatement-Issuer'sCounsel-Advice to My
Client, 24 Bus. LAW. 537 (1969).
221. Securities Act of 1933 § If, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
222. 283 F. Supp. at 687.

223. Id. at 689-92. See also Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the FederalSecurities Acts: The
BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 199 (1969); Jordan, BarChris and the Registration Process,
22 Sw L.J. 790 (1968); Wyant & Smith, BarChris: A Revaluation of Prospectus Liability?, 3
GA. L. REV. 122 (1968); Note, Section 11 Liability-Directors,Underwriters,andAccountants
Held Liablefor FailureTo Use Due Diligencein PreparingRegistrationStatement, 43 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1030 (1969).
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unequivocally place a duty of reasonable independent investigation
upon the attorney by mere virtue of his professional role as legal

counsel in a securities transaction. However, in dicta, the BarChris
court indicated that such a duty does exist. In examining the duties

of the outside counsel/director as if he were connected with the registration statement solely by virtue of his role as attorney, the court

stated:
It is claimed that a lawyer is entitled to rely on the statements of his client
and that to require him to verify their accuracy would set an unreasonably high
standard. This is too broad a generalization. It is all a matter of degree. To
require an audit would obviously be unreasonable. On the other hand, to
require a check of matters easily verifiable is not unreasonable. Even honest
clients can make mistakes. The statute imposes liability for untrue statements
regardless of whether they are intentionally untrue. 22

The BarChris decision appears to enhance the liability-for-

negligence, or duty of reasonable care, standard imposed on the attorney in Frank.An attorney, pursuant to Frank,will be held respon-

sible for potential discrepancies which a non-expert has the ability to
understand upon an examination of material actually supplied to him
by his clients. After BarChris, however, the attorney no longer can

discharge his obligations under the federal securities laws by merely
detecting discrepancies which appear on the face of the information

supplied to him. Rather, the language in BarChrisindicates that the
attorney must make a reasonable independent investigation of the

truth of all information in the non-expert portions of the registration
statement.22
Despite the apparent far-reaching scope of the attorney's duties
imposed by the Frank and BarChris decisions, the opinions leave two

important questions unanswered. First, it is not clear whether the
attorney's duty of reasonable independent investigation is limited
224. 283 F. Supp. at 690 (emphasis added).
225. As emphasized in the case of Escott v. BarChris,...
the lawyer, to protect
his client must do more than merely ask questions and rely on what is supplied to him
by others. He must independently make an investigation and independently verify the
information which is included in the Registration Statement. Shade, Securities Act of
1933-An Outline, 25 Bus. LAW. 437, 449-50 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
It is arguable that the SEC was of the opinion that such a duty of independent verification
existed at a much earlier date:
Indeed, if an attorney furnishes an opinion based solely upon hypothetical facts which
he made no effort to verify, and if he knows that his opinion will be relied upon as the
basis for a substantial distribution of unregistered securities, a serious question arises
as to the propriety of his professional conduct. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445
(Feb. 2, 1962).
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only to transactions involving registration statements and therefore
within the purview of section 11 of the Securities Act, or whether the
duty applies to all core securities conduct, or even peripherallyrelated securities conduct, of the attorney. Second, there are no
suggestions in either opinion as to the appropriate course of conduct
for the attorney once he has made the requisite independent investigation and has determined that his client may be in violation of the
federal securities laws. Surely, the attorney will be held accountable
if he takes no action whatsoever and the client commits an actual
violation. The question remains, however, whether the attorney may
escape liability merely by advising his client to desist from the prohibited activity or whether more affirmative action on his part will be
required. To some extent, the SEC is attempting to provide a possible
solution to both of these questions by initiating litigation which seeks
to impose on the attorney an implied duty of public disclosure.22
National Student Marketing: Attorney Duty of Public Disclosure
In the recently filed SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.

case,2 21the SEC is bringing suit under section 17(a) of the Securities
Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act against two law firms and
several of the firms' partners individually. The Commission alleges
that the law firms and lawyers failed to disclose to the SEC, prior to
the closing of a merger transaction involving National Student Marketing Corp. (NSMC), material financial information which they
acquired from the accounting firm which certified the merger. According to the terms of the merger, the closing of the transaction
would not be consummated until two conditions were satisfied. First,
the certifying accounting firm would be required to stipulate that it
had no reason to believe that the unaudited financial statements were
not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and practices. Second, the accounting firm would have to state
in its comfort letter that NSMC had not suffered any material change
in its financial position or results of operations since the date of the
merger agreement. When the accounting firm submitted its comfort
letter to the parties, however, it disclosed that certain significant and
retroactive adjustments in NSMC's financial statement were neces226. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp,, Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C, filed
Feb. 3, 1972). For a discussion of National Student Marketing, see notes 227-38 infra and

accompanying text.
227. Id.

Vol. 1972:969]

ATTORNEY CONDUCT

1017

sary. The law firms, their attorneys, and the directors of the two
merging corporations knew of the letter's contents, but the information was not disclosed to the SEC or the stockholders of the companies. Despite receipt of the comfort letter and certain additional accounting information of a material nature, the law firms and their
attorneys issued opinions indicating that the appropriate steps for a
merger had been taken and that to their knowledge no violation of
any federal or state securities law had occurred. In its complaint, the
SEC has taken the position that the attorneys were required (1) to
disclose the new financial information, (2) to revise the financial
statements and resolicit the shareholder proxies, and failing that, (3)
to cease representing their clients and notify the Commission of the
potential securities law violation. Broad injunctive relief is being
sought against the firms and the attorneys-a remedy which is seemingly "inappropriate to a case of first impression." '
In effect, the SEC is contending in NationalStudent Marketing
that the attorney, by virtue of his professional responsibility as legal
counsel, has an implied duty under the federal securities laws to
police and regulate the everyday securities conduct of his client and
those around him at a "grass-roots" level. Thus, as if to resolve the
2 9
two questions left unanswered in Frank and BarChris,
the SEC
would first impose on the attorney a duty to investigate his client and
228. Karmel, supra note 193, at 1155. Although the complaint charges that the attorneys
directly violated Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) and the rules promulgated
thereunder, the SEC also is contending that the attorneys aided and abetted the violation of
Exchange Act § 10(b), id. § 78j(b), and Securities Act § 17(a), id. § 771. This itself is a
significant development since aiding and abetting "has never been applied to lawyers acting
solely as counsel," Note, Attorney's Liability-Advising, Abetting, and the SEC's National
Student Marketing Offensive, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1265, 1268 (1972). Furthermore, in cases
involving a failure to act or a negligent affirmative act, there appears to be a greater likelihood
of success against an aider-abettor defendant. See, e.g., McKy v. Hochfelder, CCH 1972 FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,601 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972).
.FeNote, supra, at 1268-72. See also Ruder, Wheat & Loss, Standardsof Conduct Under the
ederal Securities Acts, 27 Bus. LAW. 75 (Special Issue, Feb. 1972). See generally Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law FraudCases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,In Pari
Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 620-44 (1972).
It would appear, therefore, that under the aiding and abetting theories the SEC could reach
the negligent conduct of an attorney in matters involving core or peripherally related securities
conduct. See Note, supra, at 1271. But cf Bucklo, Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. L. REV.
562 (1972). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the attorneys in NationalStudent Marketing will prevail since "[niegligence cases against attorneys are notoriously difficult to win, as
the courts are reluctant to hold lawyers for errors in subjective judgment." Note, supra, at 1271.
See also SEC Action in NSMA Case: Securities Bar Assured on Attorney-Client Ties,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1972, at 1, col. 3 (Statements given by Milton Cohen and Francis Wheat at
the Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation).
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apparently would extend this duty to all of the core and peripherallyrelated securities conduct of the attorney and not merely transactions
involving registration statements. Second, the SEC would combine
this duty of independent investigation with a duty to disclose to the
SEC any potential securities laws violations of the attorney's clients.
In this manner, false or misleading information and practices will
either be prevented or reported to the SEC by the attorney before the
investing public is adversely affected.
A number of views have been expressed with respect to National
Student Marketing and its implications. On the one hand, some commentators view the action as beneficial, since it represents a longoverdue recognition of higher standards for attorney conduct, with
the result that "'lawyers are just beginning to feel the responsibilities
they have had all along.' "230 As a corollary, the case may be viewed
as an attempt to erode the citadel of attorney-client privity. 31 On the
other hand, a number of problems may arise if the SEC position in
National Student Marketing is upheld. The attorney will be subject
to unlimited, unwarranted and perhaps unavoidable, securities laws
violations.2 2 Furthermore, such a result could infringe upon the attorney's advocacy rights2 33 and ultimately undermine the basic
lawyer-client relationship by requiring the "compulsory 'ratting on
the client.' ",231
Whether or not the changes in attorney responsibilities which
National Student Marketing threatens to effectuate are welcomed
with enthusiasm or criticism, it seems clear that the issues in that case
are part of a fundamental and long recognized conflict of interest
dilemma facing the attorney in his law practice in the financial
world.235 In order for the investment protection purposes of the federal securities laws to be fulfilled, the attorney must be made to serve
two masters-his client and the investing public. Since the attorney's
natural propensity is to favor the former to the disadvantage of the
latter,?" there is a strong" need for augmentation of an attorney's
duties with reference to the investing public.
230. Lawyers: The Confidence Game, NEWSWEEK, March 6, 1972, at 60, 61.
231. See Are Lawyers Confidants or Informers?, 58 A.B.A.J. 943 (1972).
232. See Green, Irate Attorneys, A Bid to Hold Lawyers Accountable to Public Stuns,
Angers Firms, supra note 7, at 1, col. I, at 17, cols. 1-3.
233. See Karmel, supra note 193. See also Are Lawyers Confidants or Informers?, supra
note 231.
234. Id. at 944.
235. See Douglas, The Lawyer and the FederalSecurities Act, supra note 2.
236. Id. at 67.
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Commentators have indicated that this conflict-of-interest problem cannot be resolved satisfactorily through a stepped-up level of
direct SEC control over attorney conduct; 237 rather, changes in the
fundamental attitudes and social responsibilities of the attorney are
necessary. Perhaps as an indication that this latter source of change
has failed for securities regulation purposes, the SEC is now advocating that the federal securities laws, by means of the ultimate specter
of civil liability, be employed as the source of augmenting the attorney's sense of responsibility to the investing public. As indicated by
its complaint in National Student Marketing, the SEC seeks to resolve the attorney's conflict-of-interest dilemma by imposing on him
an implied duty to police the public investment practices of his client.
If the SEC is successful in NationalStudent Marketing, the attorney
can no longer "close his eyes"' ' 51 to improper conduct of his clients,
but must advise his clients "how they should behave." 9 Where his
client's compliance with the federal securities laws is unlikely to be
secured, the attorney's public responsibility justifiably dictates that
he be required to disclose any potential securities laws violations to
the SEC.
CONCLUSION

The SEC, in attempting to maximize the protection afforded the
investing public, has increased the utilization and effectiveness of its
direct disciplinary controls over the attorney. In addition, the Commission, through pending litigation, is attempting to delineate more
precisely the proper role of the attorney under the federal securities
laws. 20 To the extent that the additional protection being sought for
the investing public is warranted, the imposition of these increased
demands upon the lawyer is necessary. The paramount role which the
attorney occupies in the SEC's efforts to protect the investing public
mandates that greater controls and responsibilities be placed upon
him. 24' To the extent that non-SEC controls are insufficient to regu237. See Cohen, The Lawyer's Role in Securities Regulation, supra note 2, at 306. See also
Douglas, The Lawyer and the FederalSecurities Act, supra note 2.
238. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
239. Cohen, The Lawyer's Role in Securities Regulation, supra note 2, at 307.
240. See notes 226-39 supra and accompanying text.
241. Since the Commission under the statutory scheme does not approve or pass
upon the accuracy of the various statements and reports filed with it, it is particularly
important that attorneys who prepare and verify these materials. . . assume the obliga-

tion and responsibility of diligently verifying the accuracy and completeness of such
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late attorney conduct for securities regulation purposes, the Commission must take additional steps of its own under Rule 2(e). Furthermore, as long as attorneys do not fulfill their sense of social responsibility with respect to the investing public, the imposition of implied
duties under the federal securities laws does present a viable alternative. 2 2 The augmentation of the attorney's responsibilities by means
of both SEC disciplinary controls and the federal securities laws is
justified in that "the privilege of appearing and practicing before the
Commission imposes . . . a corresponding obligation to assist in
achieving the protection of investors and the public interest that the
'23
securities laws are designed to bring about.
documents. The Commission has by the promulgation of Rule 2(e) of its Rules of
Practice established a means for disqualifying attorneys who have proved themselves
unable or unwilling to carry out such responsibilities. Initial Decision, In re Irwin L.
Germaise and Thomas F. Quinn, SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-2606 at
26 (Oct. 29, 1971) (Markun, Hearing Examiner).
For a general discussion of the central role of the attorney in directing and coordinating
securities filings, see Israels, supra note 220, at 542. See also Wyant & Smith, supra note 223,
at 137. Former SEC Commissioner and now Supreme Court Justice Douglas colorfully described the lawyer as setting the stage and directing the action in many of the financial matters
facing the Commission. See Douglas, The Lawyer and the FederalSecurities Act, supra note
2, at 70.
242. At a very early date, 1937, it was pointed out that the public-mindedness of an attorney
was a crucial factor in the SEC's ability to protect the investing public:
[T~he need for . . . regulation will be perenially acute. But until the elite of our
profession can bring to their own work a larger degree of social consciousness, there can
be but little time and energy to convert the stock peddling heathens in our midst. It is
safe to say that if the mores and ethical standards of our legal bishops were changed,
we would have solved the major problems in finance. Their forms, their practices, their
methods are copied by the lesser lights. They set the fashion ...
Until that transformation takes place you can with confidence state that any such
administrative agency as the Securities and Exchange Commission has before it the most
difficult and at the same time most significant task in the history of American finance. . . So long as the high priests of our profession are not imbued with the spirit
of legal statemanship, administrative control in the field of finance must continue to reap
• . .criticism . . . .And if, in absence of fundamental change in ethical and moral
standards of our high priests, such criticism turns to praise and opposition to confidence, . . .rest assured that administrative control has become stodgy, that high finance
has won a pyrrhic victory. . . .Douglas, The Lawyer and the FederalSecurities Act,
supra note 2, at 69.
Although the comment of Douglas seems to suggest that direct control by the SEC over
attorney conduct-for example, Rule 2(e) proceedings-are ineffective, the implied duties
under Frank, BarChris,and perhaps National Student Marketing are not.
243. Cohen, The Lawyer's Role in Securities Regulation,supra note 2, at 306. This "corresponding obligation" might also lead to future duties being imposed upon the securities practitioner, among which would include assisting the SEC in solving many of the problems facing
public investment today. Id. Cf ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 1213.
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The fundamental issue is, however, whether the added restraints
and responsibilities imposed upon the attorney by the SEC and implied under the federal securities laws have been properly designed

and implemented. For SEC purposes, the recent restructuring of attorney disciplinary rules achieves the quick and decisive action necessary to adequately protect the investing public. The often automatic
operation of the disciplinary rules reduces the demands which are

made upon the Commission's limited resources.244 In general, the
procedures and sanctions now in effect are commensurate with the
degree of harm resulting from the attorney's offense. Furthermore,

since the SEC has used its disciplinary powers fairly and in good
faith, the implementation of disciplinary proceedings cannot be criti-

cized. However, deficiencies in the wording and operation of Rule
2(e), which work to the disadvantage of the attorney, are apparent.

Many of the Rule's provisions and sanctions can be viewed as overly
broad, unnecessary or unfair, 245 and revision in these areas is needed.
National Student Marketing represents a major opportunity in
the 1970's to expand further the role which the attorney occupies
under the federal securities laws by virtue of his professional capacity.

A decision sustaining the SEC's allegations would impose upon the
attorney broader duties to advise and investigate than apparently
exist under SEC v. Frank and Escott v. BarChris Construction
Corp.246 More importantly, if the Commission prevails in its conten-

tion that the lawyer must disclose potential securities laws violations
of its clients, then it has obtained a highly effective means of regulating attorney conduct. Despite its potential advantage for the SEC,
244. For a variety of reasons, the SEC's resources are becoming more limited:
Since the passage of the Securities Act in 1933, the Congress, by additional legislation, has expanded the legal responsibilities of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
These responsibilities have also been expanded by the quantitative increase and growing
diversity in offerings of securities, by the quantitative increase in trading, by the development of additional trading markets, by an increasing variety in trading practices and by
the necessity of applying the statutes to a growing and increasingly complex economy.
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 4-5.
See also Gadsby, The Securities and Exchange Commission, I1 B.C. IND. & Co, . L. REv.
833 (1970) (finding that the SEC has streamlined certain procedures in response to the increasing pressure on its limited resources).
It has been pointed out that limited resources may have an effect on others involved in
securities filings: "The greatly increased work-load of an already overworked staff, as a practical matter, increases the responsibility of all concerned .
Cohen, The Lawyer's Role in
Securities Regulation. supra note 2, at 306.
245. See notes 194-97 supra and accompanying text.
246. See notes 213-26 supra and accompanying text.
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however, the pending National Student Marketing case threatens to
disrupt the very nature of the attorney-client relationship and undermine the lawyer's role as an advocate for his client. The potential for
unliimited and perhaps unavoidable liability raises the question of
commensurability between the degree of harm to the investing public
and the sanction imposed upon the lawyer. Due to the profound
impact which the result is likely to have on the regulation and responsibilities of the attorney under the federal securities laws, there is an
acute need for a clear judicial resolution of the broad spectrum of
issues confronting the court in NationalStudent Marketing.

